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ABSTRACT
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME

Bryan Weber
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015
Under the Supervision of Professor John S. Heywood and Professor Hamid Mohtadi

Essay 1: “Can Safe Ride Program Reduce Urban Crime?” This paper evaluates
the influence of a safe ride program at a public university on neighborhood crime in a
major urban area. Using an hours of the week panel, the program's operation is associated
with an approximate 14 percent reduction in crime. The program being open appears to
have roughly similar influence in reducing violent and non-violent crime. Moreover,
increases in rides (the intensity of the program) are also associated with reductions in
crime. Such increases in program intensity are also associated with notably greater
reductions in crime occurring on weekends. The cost of the safe ride program suggests it
is a relatively efficient means of reducing crime.

Essay 2: “University Provided Transit and Urban Crime.” This paper uniquely
examines the influence of a new university bus service on urban crime. It concentrates on
the interaction between the new bus service and a long-standing safe ride program. The
new bus service reduces the number of students using the safe ride program and such
substitution raises the well-known concern that a fixed transit route may concentrate
victims and criminals increasing crime along the new bus routes. Despite this concern, a
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series of difference-in-difference estimates demonstrate that the bus service reduces
crime in the entire university neighborhood and that this reduction is actually largest
along the new bus routes.

Essay 3: “Modeling Adversary Decisions and Strategic Response.” This work
uses a sequential game of conflict between a government and a terrorist organization to
analyze the strategic choices between large extreme and large conventional threats. Some
of these extreme options: chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear attacks (CBRN),
are both terrifying and highly improbable. Conversely, conventional attacks using
firearms or explosives, are comparatively more likely but less destructive. Rather than
leaving the game as a theoretical exercise, we calibrate the model to real data from global
terror attacks, and forecast anticipated casualties when an informed adversary prepares a
large attack against an uninformed government.
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Chapter 1: Can Safe Rides Reduce Urban Crime?
1. Introduction
This paper examines a longitudinal case study designed to determine if safe ride
programs, common at many universities, reduce urban crime. The study design matches
local crime data to the area and service hours of the safe ride program. The estimates
control for the hourly fixed effects and sensible covariates. They suggest the safe ride
program reduces crime counts by 14%. This influence persists among different categories
of crime. Moreover, increased program intensity, as measured by the number of rides
delivered, also decreases crime counts. This influence is greater on weekends, as one
might anticipate. The cost of the safe ride program suggests it is a relatively efficient way
to reduce crime.
This investigation is important as private expenditures on crime deterrence and
prevention are enormous. As but one illustration, Americans spend more on private
security forces ($41B) than on police ($13B) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). Colleges and
universities are particularly concerned about safety. Their expenditures on safety not only
include safe ride programs, but also foot patrols , night-time escort services, emergency
phone systems, increased lighting, and safety and crime prevention presentations. Indeed,
14% of all US higher education institutions claim that the primary responsibility for their
campus security lies with private security forces and initiatives (Lewis et al., 1997).
As one such initiative, safe ride programs pick up and deliver students and staff
for transportation near the university. The programs vary substantially, but most are
designed to prevent victimization, or to reduce drunk driving by students (Lewis et al.,

1997). Additionally, the programs are often touted for their convenience to students
(Binghamton University, 2013). As of the latest examination by the National Center for
Education Statistics, 34% of public four-year universities, and 24% of their private fouryear counterparts had safe ride programs set up for students and staff (Lewis et al., 1997).
Since the Jeanne Clery Act of 1991, universities must make crime data public for their
campus area. These data are often pivotal in the enrollment decisions of potential students
and their families. This creates an additional private incentive for safe ride programs.1
The research on safe rides remains largely anecdotal, and to the best of my
knowledge there has been no prior economic evaluation of their efficiency in reducing
crime.2 This reflects, in part, the remarkable diversity in these programs as there is no
federal or state design or regulation of the many individual safe ride programs
implemented by US universities. Survey data suggest that the majority of students (60%)
believe that safe ride programs are effective, while an equal percentage claim safe ride
programs also promote drinking (Elam et al., 2006). Moving beyond such surveys is
warranted, as safe ride programs represent a substantial and commonplace investment,
and there exists a growing academic interest in the broad relationship between
transportation and crime.
Jackson and Owens (2011) study the relationship between the operating hours of
the Washington DC subway, DUI's and drinking-related crimes. They create an hour of
the week panel to show that a 1999 expansion of the subway service by 3 hours per week
reduced DUI arrests by 14%. At the same time, the expansion increased other alcohol
related crimes by 5.4%. They suggest that the subway simultaneously provides an
alternative to drunk driving, while increasing access to alcohol. Other research explores
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whether or not transit station s are associated with greater crime in surrounding
neighborhoods (Poister, 1996; Liggett et al., 2003). The existing economic theory
suggests that safe ride programs influence crime by changing the profits of illegal activity
(Becker, 1968). Safe ride program s lower the number of potential victims around the
university, creating a less target rich environment for criminals. Moreover, universities
may use the transit vehicles as additional eyes on the street, so pedestrians and frequently
passed households will be safer. As a consequence, the ride program increases the costs
of committing crime near the university, lowering the profit of crime, and motivating
potential criminals to instead pursue legal activities, or choose another time or place for
their criminal activities. Finally, and with some irony, safe ride programs may transport,
and thereby contain, students who otherwise might choose criminal behavior while
walking on the streets.
The possibility remains that the program need not decrease crime. The safe ride
program examined here makes trips to and from entertainment districts with bars, which
increase student access to alcohol. Alcohol causes impaired judgment, resulting in
victimization, or leading to students committing crime (Liggett et al., 2003). Since the net
effect and the magnitude of the impact is not inherently clear, empirical analysis is
needed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the
safe ride program in detail, and examines the source of identifying variation in its
provision. The matching of crime data and controls are then described. The third section
describes the methodology, which addresses the possibility for reverse causality. It also
presents basic results, and alternative specifications. The fourth section checks for
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heterogeneity in the impact of the program. The fifth section makes a comparison of the
cost-effectiveness of this program versus that of the police. The sixth and final section
concludes and suggests further research.

2. Safe Rides and Crime: The Case Study

2.1 Description of the Safe Ride Program
The data follows Be On the Safe Side (BOSS), a safe ride program operate d by
the Student Services Department of University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (UWM). UWM
has about 30,000 students, and is located on the upper east side of Milwaukee. About 1/3
of all students are residential and live on campus or in the immediate area. A new
initiative beginning fall of 2013 requires first-year students to live in student housing for
one year, suggesting that this proportion will increase (University Housing Department,
2012).
At UWM, all students and staff have access to BOSS, which provides taxi-like
services in a region surrounding UW-Milwaukee (See Figure 1). These services are free
at the point of service, but each student pays a segregated fee, which includes $10.30 a
semester to support BOSS (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2012). Students call for
a ride, wait indoors until a van arrives, and then the van takes them to their destination,
which must be an address rather than a street corner. Vans are marked by combinations of
unique lights and paint, and are connected by radio with a central station in the student
union.
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Typically, the program operates at night, being open about 25% of all hours. The
safe ride program takes students to any destination within an operating radius of
approximately 1.5 miles around campus, including bars, supermarkets, and residence
halls. The program operates in all seasons, including summer, permitting students to
anticipate it being available for reasons varying from grocery runs to replacing designated
drivers. Over the study period from 2005 to 2008, BOSS provided an average of 133,733
rides a year at an average cost of $3.18 each.3 Such trips add up to a great distance, with
BOSS vans traveling 255,000 miles per year (University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
2012). The program began operating on September 5th, 2001, and school officials
anticipate it continuing well into the future.

2.2. Data on the Safe Ride Program
Data on operating hours and the number of rides has been collected hourly from
January 1st, 2005 to June 30th, 2008. This data window reflects the employment of a data
entry worker, and as such there are no comparable records outside this period. Our initial
independent variable is whether or not the safe ride program is open during any particular
hour of the week. The program is typically open during the evening and early morning
hours, both when school is in session and otherwise, but does close for inclement weather
and holidays. In addition, policy changes have occasionally altered the operating hours of
the service. The result is a large amount of variation, as shown in Table 1. The hours of
2am through 4pm show no variation, because the program was always closed. The
remaining hours of the week, the early morning and late evening hours, average 24
separate instances of transitioning between open and closed each, out of the potential
5

181. This variation allows for testing the impact of the changing hours of the program,
and suggests that the provision, or absence, of the safe ride program is not clearly
associated with any singular event. Ultimately, the data is arranged into an hour of the
week panel. This arrangement follows Jackson and Owens (2011), and yields 168 (7x24)
hourly observations for each of 182 weeks. Thus, a unit of observation would be the first
hour of Monday, observed for 182 weeks. In the fixed effect model, I examine the
variation generated by changes within each hour of the week. Thus, for the 182 weeks,
there are a maximum of 181 changes that could occur within the first hour of Monday.4

2.3. Matching Crime Data to the Safe Ride Program
Crime data is gathered from the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD), and is
available through the online system Community Mapping and Analysis for Safety
Strategies (COMPASS) (City of Milwaukee, 2014). This system identifies the hour and
date of each separate crime, the exact address where the crime occurred, and the type of
crime.5 The system tracks 35 different crime types, tabulated in Table 23, placed in
Appendix A. COMPASS has an entry for every report issued within city boundaries, but
only after January 1st, 2005. Using geographic information systems (GIS) software, only
those crimes with addresses inside the strict boundaries of the safe ride program service
region are selected. The crime types are aggregated into a single total crime count
variable. Within that region, there is an average of one crime an hour.6 After the crime
data were limited to the geographic area of the program and aggregated into hourly totals,
the data is then restricted to the 2005-2008 window where both crime and safe ride data
are available. The crime data were matched to the safe ride data in hour of the week
6

panels for all 182 weeks. Thus, for every hour, I know the number of crimes in the
service region, and whether or not the program was in service. The data in Figure 2
indicate that crime is trending up over the data window, while the program hours show no
trend.7 Empirical estimates will disaggregate the crime count data into more narrow types
of crime to check for variation in the impact of the safe ride program and will account for
the apparent trend.

2.4. Matching Data on Controls

While the ultimate objective is to obtain an estimate of the impact of the safe ride
program on crime counts, there is a recognized need to control for other short-term
determinants of crime. Obvious controls, such as the month of the year, day, and hour,
are extracted from the time on the crime report. Beyond that, UWM's official records
provide full information on the dates class was in session. This includes finals week, and
keeps track of various mid-semester breaks and vacations. Any calendar day with school
in session is marked as a school day. Both school days and month of the year are strong
determinants of the number of students around campus.
A complementary selection of weather controls from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (NOAA, 2012) was obtained. These controls are
daily measures of precipitation, snowfall, snow on the ground, and minimum
temperature.8 Such controls have been shown to be deterrents of crime (Falk, 1952;
Anderson, 1989; Cohn, 1990; Jacob et al., 2004), and are also strong determinants of the
number of rides provided by the safe ride program. The daily weather is matched to each
hour of that calendar day.
7

While a number of other demographic controls could be added, such as income,
age, or racial demographics, they would not vary substantially over the data window. The
final data set then consists of 30,648 consecutive hourly observations. For each hour, the
data set provides the day of week and the month, the number of crimes in the service
region, an indicator if the safe ride program operated or not, the number of rides provide
if operating, an indicator that school was in session or not, and indicators of weather. The
summary statistics for all data are shown in Table 2.

3. Estimation Strategy and Initial Results
In thinking about the influence of safe ride programs on crime, there is concern
with reverse causality. One might anticipate that university policy makers would target a
safe ride program to be open during high crime hours and leave it closed in low crime
hours. If this influence dominates, one could find a positive correlation between the hours
the program is open and the count of crime. Indeed, data gathered across US cities
confirms that more crimes occur during the hours the safe ride program is in operation,
5pm to 2am (Falk, 1952). Generally, national data confirm that relatively little crime
occurs between 2am and noon, and the night hours before 2am have more crime than
daylight hours (Dudzinski, 2011). Again, a rational policy maker would target high crime
night hours, potentially generating a misleading correlation with crime counts.
The above concern emphasizes the importance of selecting an estimation strategy
that controls for this reverse causality. In order to measure the impact of the safe ride
program, a variety of specifications were explored, but ultimately I select a specification
that controls for fixed effects in an hour of the week panel. Each hour of the week is
8

presumed to have a unique propensity for crime over the data window. This propensity
can be controlled for because of the frequent openings and closings of the safe ride
program within any hour over the time series. The estimates show that failure to control
for these fixed effects generates an estimate for the safe ride program that conflates the
program's crime reducing influence with the tendency of the program to operate during
high-crime hours. By comparing pooled and fixed effect estimates, the size of this
confounding effect is isolated.

3.1. Primary Specification and Results
As suggested, the variation in the provision of the safe ride program permits
identification of the programs’ impact on crime. The following regression is estimated,
adding controls to build a more complete specification:
=

∗

+

∗

+

The unit of observation is the hour of week, i, from week t in the 182 weeks of the
time frame. The variable of interest is openit, where openit is 1 if the safe ride service is
available that particular hour, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient

indicates the

relationship between the safe ride program being open and crime. The contents of the
control vector,

, vary with the specific estimate. Noting that the crime data is count

data, Poisson estimates are typically presented, but I will show that OLS produces very
similar estimates.

3.2. Primary Results
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In Table 3, the basic Poisson estimates are shown with four different specification
s of the control vector,

. Conveniently, the coefficients can be interpreted as the

approximate response in the percentage of hourly crimes from a unit increase in the
independent variable.9
Poisson data may suffer from overdispersion, which occurs when the standard
errors are greater than the mean (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998; Atkins and Gallop, 2007).
This can create incorrectly small estimates of the standard errors. In order to prevent
overdispersion from creating false positives, the coefficients are bootstrapped 200 times
following the recommendation from Efron and Tibshirani (1993).10
Concern about correlation within the hours of the week leads to clustering
standard errors by each hour of the week. After bootstrapping and clustering, the
estimated standard errors are about twice as large as the unadjusted errors. As a
consequence, false positives are less likely.
Column 1 of Table 3 shows the initial simple regression when pooling the data
(not controlling for fixed effects), and indicates that the safe ride program is correlated
with a weakly significant 9% decline in crime. In Column 2, I include dummies for
whether school is in session, and to compensate for the cyclical components of yearly
crime, dummies were added for the month of the year. When school is in session, crime
is 15% greater than when school is closed. I found that the months of August through
November emerge as higher crime months, perhaps because of the large number of new
first year students arriving in those months. The pooled estimate of the effect of the safe
ride program remains about the same at 8%, suggesting that these variables are not
correcting for a large omitted variable bias. Column 3 adds weather to the controls, since
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weather clearly impacts both demand for transportation as well as crime. These weather
controls are precipitation, snowfall, snow on the ground, and minimum temperature. The
weather effects suggest a general theme: crimes are more likely in hospitable weather and
less likely in inclement weather, such as snow, rain, or cold. The impact of weather on
crime is attributed to criminals facing limited access and availability of victims on the
street. Such a result also fits with the suggestion that hot weather itself may induce
criminal behavior (Falk, 1952; Anderson, 1989; Cohn, 1990; Jacob et al., 2004). In any
event, the estimated impact of the safe ride program remains at roughly 8%, again
suggesting that weather, while clearly an important determinate of crime counts, appears
to be uncorrelated with the impact of the safe ride program being open. While the signs
on the controls seem reasonable, the regressions have not yet accounted for the fixed hour
of the week effect.
The next regression accounts for the fact that each hour of the week tends to have
different amounts of total crime. Thus, the estimate is generated by variation over time
within the hour of week. The fixed effect Poisson estimation (Wooldridge, 2001) is one
of the few nonlinear fixed effect estimates which avoids the incidental parameter
problems (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). The estimated effect of the safe ride program,
shown in Column 4, jumps dramatically to 14%, suggesting that almost half the true
impact (6%) was hidden by the placement of the program in high crime hours. Thus,
while adding the other controls had no noticeable impact on the program's coefficient, the
fixed effects appear to be critical omitted variables.
For comparison, the regressions in Table 3 have been repeated using naive OLS
estimates in Table 4. In the estimates, the coefficient on the program represents the
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reduction in crime counts associated with the program being open. The influence of the
program is a reduction of 0.07 crimes an hour in early estimates, but grows to 0.12 when
using fixed effects. The OLS estimates, therefore, also exemplify the strong impact of the
fixed effects. Again suggesting much of the impact is hidden behind the tendency for the
program to be placed in high crime hours. Overall, the similarity of the OLS estimates
suggests that the results do not appear to be dependent on the functional form.11
It is emphasized that there are two reasons why the hour of the week fixed
effects could be critical. First, as has been suggested, it may be that the hours in which
the safe ride program is typically open are those with high crime. Second, it could simply
be that within the hours the program is typically open, but may be closed, there are
important hour of the week fixed effects. In this second possibility, there could be
peripheral hours (very late at night or early in the morning) that tend to have lower crime
and these are the hours that the safe ride program is less likely to be open. To distinguish
between these two cases, the sample of hours is limited to the hours of the week in which
the safe ride program has been open at least once, a restricted sample of \typically open
hours". Table 5 reproduces the four Poisson estimates from Table 3 on this restricted
sample of typically open hours.
The estimated coefficients on the open dummy, indicating the program is open,
are essentially the same across all specifications. Moreover, the coefficient on the open
dummy is virtually identical (14%) to the fixed effects Poisson estimates in Table 3. For
example, a simple comparison between open and closed hours in the smaller sample
shows the safe ride program is associated with a 14% reduction in crime, and the further
addition of fixed effects only changes the estimate by 1%. Therefore, it is concluded that
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within the typically open hours, the fixed effect component in the variation of crime is
not critical. The important distinction for estimation is, in fact, that the program is
typically provided in high crime hours.

3.3 Challenges to Identification
There exist several potential reasons why one might question the results presented
so far. First, the estimates have not tested for a time trend in crime. The results could
reflect the program growing or contracting while crime simply has a trend in the opposite
direction. To test for this possibility, I include a weekly linear time trend for the entire
data window for Tables 3, 4, and 5, and find no meaningful change. For example, in
Table 3, column 4, when including the time trend, the coefficient on the trend, while
significant, is estimated as a very small 0.00198, suggesting a very small an increase in
crime rates. The coefficient of interest measuring the association of rides with crime
counts remains in the same neighborhood at a negative and significant -13.3%. As an
alternative, I added dummies for each calendar year. While several were significant, the
coefficient on the program remained 13% and highly significant.
Second, it remains possible that general patterns in the city's crime count are
somehow driving the results. We provide a falsification test to emphasize that the results
are, indeed, unique to the treatment area. The model was re-estimated using the crime
counts for a city neighborhood that was eight miles away from the program boundary,
Bay View. This neighborhood has the most similar demographics of the remaining city
areas, which leads to its informal nickname as “The Other East Side". The hope is that
such a neighborhood will have similar crime dynamics as the treatment area. Re13

estimating the hour fixed effects model, the influence of the program being open on
crime in Bay View returns an insignificant coefficient of -0.028 with a standard error of
0.059. Had this falsification test generated a significant coefficient, the estimated
influence of the program on the university neighborhood might be doubted. The
coefficient in the treated region was estimated at -0.152, more than two of these standard
errors smaller than the value of the Bay View coefficient.
A third concern is that the estimates can only control for time-invariant fixed
effects. Thus, if policy makers have placed the program in consistently high-crime hours,
we can hold that constant. What is not accounted for is the potential for a stochastic
change in crime influencing policy. A classic example would be if crime is unusually
high and policy makers expand the program. This is then followed by a natural mean
reversion generating a misleading picture of the program's influence. While we cannot
completely rule this out, we follow Priks (2009), by arguing that our falsification test
provides some reassurance. If the spike in crime that generated the policy change was
evident around the city, our Bay View results should have also returned negative and
significant results. These results suggest that the pattern is not driven by sudden and
temporary spikes in crime, at least, at the city wide level.12

3.4 The Role of Zero Inflation
The earlier results in Table 5 show that the fixed effects estimates from the all
hours sample are broadly similar to any estimate from the smaller sample of typically
open hours. Yet, even within the typically open sample used for Table 5, 53% of the
hourly observations have a crime count of zero, suggesting zero-inflation.13
14

Despite the indication that ZIP may be a better fit for the data, the computational
advantages of using the simple Poisson approach in this context are enormous. Several
efforts are made to estimate the ZIP. In this case, the computing time of the ZIP model in
the full sample proved infeasible. Even when restricting attention to the typically open
hours, the estimate needed to be moved onto a 96 core processor as parallel tasks
(University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013) in order to resample and estimate
coefficients. The output of these re-estimations were then aggregated and used to
calculate the standard errors of the ZIP model.14
To obtain an estimate of the impact of the safe ride program, the average marginal
effects (AME) must be calculated (Bartus, 2005). The standard errors of the AME were
bootstrapped 200 times and accounted for clustering among hours of the week.
Two separate estimates were undertaken. In the first estimate, the outcome relies
upon the broad similarity found in the earlier estimates between the sample of typically
open hours and the fixed effect estimates in the all hours sample. Thus, the estimates use
the typically open hours sample, without hour fixed effects. The results are presented in
Column 1 of Table 6, and the controls play a broadly similar role to that isolated earlier.
The results also suggest a significant 14% decrease in crime when accounting for zero
inflation in the model. The estimate is virtually identical to those without the ZIP. In the
second estimate, the typically open sample is again used, but includes dummies for each
hour of the week, recognizing the possible bias associated with doing so (Greene, 2001,
2004).15 The large number of dummies makes both bootstrapping and clustering more
difficult, but the point estimate remains nearly identical and significant, as shown in
Column 2.
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While not the same functional form as estimated in the previous tables, the critical
point estimates remain quite firmly around 14%. Thus, there is no indication that failure
to account for zero-inflation results in misleading estimates in the earlier tables. As a
consequence, in order to save substantial time and present a full range of estimates, focus
remains on Poisson estimates when examining treatment heterogeneity and robustness.

4. Extensions
In this section, the simple Poisson estimates are re-examined, with the intention to
examine heterogeneity in the measured treatment effect. First, the influence of the
program is examined for variation across types of crime. Second, differences in the
impact of the program during the weekend as compared to during the weekdays are
examined. In the second subsection, an investigation is conducted of a measure of
program intensity, the number of rides delivered in an hour. At issue is whether this
measure is associated with reduced crime, and whether the heterogeneity identified with
the dichotomous measure remains important.

4.1 Heterogeneity in Treatment
One might expect differentiation in impacts across types of crime, as have been
found in other papers (Levitt, 2002; Jackson and Owens, 2011). Typically, violent crimes
are thought of as crimes of impulse, and therefore less responsive to economic incentives,
as compared to nonviolent crimes. We use the Uniform Crime Report's (UCR) definition
of crime against persons as a measure of violent crimes, and compare it with the
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remaining categories, crimes against property and against society (US Department of
Justice, 2000).16 Thus, each hour includes a number of violent and a number of
nonviolent crimes. This allows two separate estimates of the influence of the program.
The sample is that of all hours, and the controls remain the same. The estimates continue
to be bootstrapped and account for clustering.
Table 7 shows that the estimated impact of the program is roughly similar in
preventing each type of crime. The magnitudes of the impact (17% for crimes against
property and against society, and 13% for personal crimes) are both significant, and
roughly comparable to the overall estimate of 14%. Both estimate s are within a standard
deviation of the other, also suggesting a relatively homogeneous impact. If anything,
there is a slightly greater impact on violent crimes than nonviolent ones. Again, the
pattern of coefficients on the controls remain broadly similar to all previous regressions.
Weekends on and around campus involve frequent trips associated with social events,
parties, and entertainment districts. These trips appear different in kind from the typical
weekday trips between home and campus. Criminals may target those traveling to and
from these locations differently. Those traveling for entertainment purposes likely carry
more cash, increasing the potential revenues earned by criminals. Moreover, providing
rides to events with alcohol may actually increase student victimization, since they are
generally less aware of their surroundings. Alcohol may even encourage criminal
behavior by students themselves, such as disorderly conduct or destruction of property as
they walk between locations. This suggests there could be a different impact from
program operation in the weekends than on the weekdays.
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To test for heterogeneous impacts, the aggregate total crime counts are once again
examined. An interaction term between open and the weekend is added, taking the value
1 when the program is open on Friday and Saturday, and 0 otherwise, to the all hours
specifications from Table 3.17 The new set of estimates are shown in Table 8. The results
show no significant impact of either open or its interaction with weekends until fixed
effects are added in Column 4. Again, this demonstrates the importance of controlling for
the policy makers tendency to offer the program in high crime hours. After adding fixed
effects, the coefficient on open again doubles from a negative but insignificant 7% to a
negative and significant 16%. The coefficient on the interaction term is positive, but
remains far from significant. Nonetheless, the positive coefficient on the interaction
between open and weekend hints the program may be less effective when open on the
weekends. Again, the controls behave similarly to previous results. The next section
compares these estimates with those obtained from examining the program intensity,
where a far stronger difference is discovered.

4.2. Program Intensity
Beyond simply being open and closed, the number of hourly rides given while the
program is open dramatically varies between zero to one hundred seventy-five. This
variation largely reflects not the policy-makers supply, but rather the potential victims’
demand for rides.18 It seems reasonable that demand is highest at times or during
circumstances of the greatest anticipated crime. This might imply a positive association
between the number of rides and crime. Yet, the provision of additional rides indicates
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the extent to which potential victims are moved off the street and so may be associated
with a genuine reduction in crime, a reduction that could hopefully be isolated.
To isolate this influence, the sample is limited to include only the hours in which
the program is open. Within that sample, the total number of rides given in the hour is the
measure of treatment intensity. The estimates, shown in Table 9, use the same
bootstrapping and clustering as previously discussed. The first column uses the intensity
measure in a simple Poisson regression. It indicates a statistically significant decline in
crime of about a fourth of a percent per ride. The second two columns display the
additional influence of school in session, weather, and month controls. These controls
appear associated with both crime and the demand for rides, as shown by the now small
and insignificant coefficient on the number of rides delivered. While weather was not an
important omitted variable when examining the coefficient indicating when the program
is open, it does emerge as influential on the rides coefficient. This seems reasonable as
weather likely influences the number of rides during hours the safe ride program is open,
but does not affect whether or not the safe ride program is open.
The final estimate in Table 9 adds hour of the week fixed effects, and more than
doubles the magnitude of the coefficient on rides. It is now highly significant, and the
magnitude implies that an increase in the number of rides by one standard deviation (17
rides in an hour) is associated with a crime count that is 8.4% lower in that hour. Once
again, controlling for hour of the week fixed effects is critical in estimating the influence
of the program on crime. Failure to do so results in estimates that suggest the program is
ineffective. Yet, this suggestion largely reflects the tendency of the program to give more
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rides in hours of high crime. The pattern of controls remain roughly unchanged as a result
of the fixed effects.19
Next, the rides measure is examined for heterogeneity in treatment. Crimes are
again divided into two types, crimes against persons, which represents violent crimes,
and the remaining categories, crimes against property and crimes against society. The
sample continues to include only those hours in which the program is open. The results,
shown in Table 10, indicate that more rides are correlated with a lower crime count for
both types of crime. It is noted that the weather controls are weaker in this regression,
likely due to a strong correlation with requests for rides. This does not detract, however
from the main point of this table. An increase in the number of rides by one standard
deviation (17 rides in an hour) is associated with a decline in nonviolent crime of 7%, and
a decline in violent crimes of 11%. Both estimates are significant. This suggests the
delivering of rides may be more effective at preventing violent crimes in the targeted
neighborhood. While a formal test of differences is unavailable, it should be noted that
each estimate is more than 2.5 standard deviations from the other.
The next investigation aims to isolate the variation in the influence of program
intensity between weekends and weekdays. Continuing to use the sample of only open
hours, I use the weekend dummy and interact it with the number of rides given by the
program in each hour, and repeat the estimations from Table 9. The same clustering and
bootstrapping techniques continue to be used. Column 1 of Table 11 shows that the
estimate without other controls indicates that rides given on weekends are associated with
a significantly larger decrease in crime than rides given on weekdays. Columns 2 and 3
introduce controls and this results in the coefficients on rides becoming statistically
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insignificant. Yet, column 4 adds the fixed effects, and again causes the coefficient on
rides to become large and highly significant, a pattern seen earlier. The result of the fixed
effect estimate is a doubling of the coefficient on hourly rides back to a similar value as
seen in Column 1. The point estimate suggests that an additional ride lowers the number
of crimes by 0.3 percent. At the same time, the addition of fixed effects has an even
larger impact on the interaction term, quadrupling the point estimate to a negative 0.5
percent. Thus, each ride on the weekend is associated with a total reduction of crime of
0.8 percent. Again, this suggests the fixed effects account for a large conflating effect,
namely the higher demand for rides in hours of the week prone to high crime. It is noted
that the coefficients for the controls are otherwise similar to previous estimates.
The relative magnitudes suggest that an increase in rides by one standard
deviation lowers the crime in that weekday hour by 5%, but if the same number of rides
are delivered on a weekend, the crime during that hour declines by 13%. This suggests
that the rides the program delivers on the weekend are noticeably and significantly more
effective. On the weekend, a marked increase in students who are relatively easy and
lucrative targets for criminals is anticipated. On the weekend, students may be carrying
cash for entertainment costs, and alcohol may impair their judgment. The rides program
removes high probability targets from the streets and so appears to have a larger influence
on the weekend than on weekdays. This suggests a particularly strong effect of increasing
program intensity on the weekends.
When comparing the two measures of the program's impact, there was no
significant difference between weekends and weekdays when looking at the open status
of the program, but now, a significant difference when examining rides delivered. The
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simple indication of whether or not the program is open pools high ride hours with low
ride hours together into simply open hours. It emerges that this variation within the open
hours masked a critical difference how the program influences crime on weekends and
weekdays.

5. Cost-effectiveness Comparison
A rough comparison shows that the safe ride program may be at least as costeffective as police. Calculations support that this program was associated with an
estimated reduction of 220 crimes a year.20 This is about 0.6% of the city's total yearly
crime reported to the UCR (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011). Comparing this to the
effectiveness of officers as measured by (Levitt, 2002), it is found that to eliminate the
same number of crimes, an increase of 1.2% in the police force would be needed.21 This
would cost over $1,300,000.22 The safe ride program itself costs about $425,000,
suggesting that the program may be very cost-effective.
It is recognized that this estimate is only a very rough approximation of the
relative cost-effectiveness. It is possible that the safe ride program does not eliminate
crime, but simply displaces it. See Bowers and Johnson (2003) on the general issue of
measuring crime displacement. If displacement occurs, criminals respond by relocating
crime to another time or place where net returns are higher. As a consequence, the actual
reduction of crime from the program will be lower than estimated here. Thus, the
program may cause crime to move out of the university area and into the surrounding
neighborhoods not serviced by the program. This may not influence the efficiency of the
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program from the universities’ perspective, but is relevant from a social welfare
perspective.
I have undertaken two separate regressions to test for the presence of the
displacement. Checking for spatial displacement, I examine the relationship between the
hours the program is open and the crime rate in a postal code adjacent to the safe ride
program's operating boundaries. Estimating the hours fixed effect model, I now use crime
counts from the outside postal code, but all else remains the same. I find that the open
hours of the program are correlated with an insignificant reduction in crime of -1.8% in
the adjacent postal code.23 This does not support the idea that the program is causing
substantial displacement in the neighboring postal code. I next return to crime counts in
the program service region but add two indicator dummies, one for the hour before the
program opens, and one for the hour after the program closes. These coefficients are
insignificant with t-stats less than one, and are both negative. Overall, none of these
estimates find evidence to support the claim that displacement is occurring, but it is
possible that the displacement is more complex than these tests could uncover.
Another concern is that the safe ride program operates in a middle class college
neighborhood, while police operate across the entire city. It seems intuitive that other
neighborhoods, such as very low income or industrial areas, will vary in responsiveness
to measures to reduce crime. Consequently, placing a safe ride program in a dramatically
different area is unlikely to have an equivalent effect. Therefore, one should be cautious
in generalizing the effectiveness of the program to areas that lacks similar demographic
characteristics.
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In addition, there is likely complementarity between police and the safe ride
program. Police are present at all times in the analysis. As a result, no evidence has been
generated that the program reduces crime independent of police, but rather, the program
does so in conjunction with police presence.24 To assume the program will reduce crime
with a reduction of police presence would be unwarranted.
Finally, it also seems sensible that the university provides implicit subsidies to the
program. It is also unclear whether I have sufficiently itemized the full cost of the
program. Use of school infrastructure, such as rooms and email services for advertising to
students, may not be included in the costs of the BOSS program.
Despite these concerns, the evidence suggests that the safe ride program has been
an effective method of obtaining time and location specific reductions in crime for this
particular university neighborhood. As this rough estimate seems to suggest, it appears to
be a cost-effective alternative in comparison to adding officers to an existing police force.

6. Conclusion
In this paper I examine a safe ride program operating in a major metropolitan
area. Using fixed effect estimates in a Poisson regression, I find that an open safe ride
program is associated with a reduction in the overall crime count of 14%. About half this
impact becomes apparent only when recognizing the tendency of the policy makers to put
the safe ride program into high crime hours and either using fixed effects, or dropping the
hours in which the program never operates. A ZIP model confirms that 14% reduction in
crime. The impacts of the program being open remains relatively homogeneous among
days of the week and between different types crime.
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It is further found that the crime count responds to the intensity of the safe ride
program. As the program increases the rides delivered by one standard deviation, crime
declines by more than 8%. Increasing the program's intensity is at least as effective at
reducing violent crime as it is at reducing nonviolent crime. An increase in intensity
appears to be more effective in reducing weekend crime than weekday crime.
Using the estimate of 14% to generate a rough guess of the cost-effectiveness of
the program, I find that the program accomplishes crime reduction in a cost-effective
manner relative to expanding the police force. I recognize the limitation of this
comparison but suggest that for the particular neighborhood examined that the program
has been a relative success.
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Chapter 2: University Provided Transit and Urban Crime
1. Introduction
Recent research demonstrates that “safe ride” programs, common to urban
universities and hospitals, can reduce crime by providing taxi-like transport to students
and staff (Weber 2014). Yet, safe rides are only one of a variety of transportation
programs often provided by urban universities, and broader comparisons should be
undertaken that take account of this mix. This paper examines reported neighborhood
crime as a major private urban university supplements a large safe ride program with a
dedicated and scheduled bus service along prime commuting routes.25 We find that the
advent of the bus service reduces use of the safe-ride program. This raises the concern
that the bus service may concentrate potential victims and crime along its fixed routes.
Our difference-in-difference estimates show that the new bus service reduced crime in the
campus neighborhood overall, and that the largest reductions were actually along the bus
route.
While the details vary substantially, urban universities, major medical facilities
and, to a lesser extent, private secondary schools frequently offer dedicated transport
services. These services can be provided directly by the institution or they can be
provided by private firms through contract. The private firm University Shuttle is
representative when they argue in their promotional material that their services “improve
campus safety and security” (University Shuttle 2014). The services can be designed to
reduce drunk driving by providing trips to and from bars (Sacramento State University
2014), or can consciously exclude such trips to focus on “preventing robbery and
assaults” during trips between home and campus (Oregon State University 2014).
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Critically, the services can be either safe rides with radio dispatched point-to-point
service (essentially a taxi), or they can be scheduled shuttle services that stop at prime
locations or along major commuting thoroughfares (essentially a bus). Often
combinations of the two types of services are provided. Their interaction has not
previously been examined.
Our subject university had a large and well-used safe ride program that provided
point-to-point service within an area that included an urban campus and the surrounding
neighborhood dominated by student housing. After fifteen years of offering this service,
the university augmented it with two regularly scheduled bus lines that cross the safe ride
area on major thoroughfares. This new option to transport students may reduce crime by
lowering the number of students walking the neighborhood. The bus service also
creates additional eyes and ears that may increase the probability of crime
detection, and reduce the expected profitability of crime. Moreover, like all student
transportation systems, the bus service may reduce crime committed by students
themselves, who may be contained on the bus rather than disrupting others in the
neighborhood (Weber 2014).
Alternatively, as the safe ride program remained in operation, one might
anticipate that the bus service substituted for this earlier program. Those taking the bus
service do so instead of calling the safe ride service. Individuals that might otherwise
wait inside for a safe ride and be taken to a destination, now walk to the bus route, wait
for transport, and potentially walk again at the other end. To the extent that this
substitution happens, those who use the service may be more vulnerable to crime.
Moreover, the bus service brings together groups of students at known times to wait for,
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or be dispersed from, the bus. This could improve the ability of criminals to target
students. Thus, the advent of the bus service could increase crime, especially when
substituting for the existing safe ride program. This increase in crime would be especially
evident along the bus routes.
Our exploration of this issue fits with a long line of economic research on the
relationship between public transit and crime. Becker (1968) presents the general
argument that the amount of crime reflects its profitability. Subsequent researchers argue
that transit availability and cost influence this profitability, although the influence is often
ambiguous and depends on the particular circumstance. Lower cost transit can get
potential victims off the street, but criminals may also use lower-priced transit to target
victims or to expand their own search for victims. Critically, some forms of transit
require waiting periods that may make riders vulnerable. For example, evidence from
Chicago makes clear that commuter rail stations have particularly high rates of robberies
(Bernasco and Block, 2011; Bernasco, et. al. 2013) and more sophisticated examination
of crime counts shows a modest increase in neighborhood crime associated with the
opening a new commuter rail station (Poister, 1996; Liggett, et. al. 2003). Yet, there
remains evidence to the contrary (Billings, et al. 2011) and one reason for these mixed
results may be that criminals themselves use transit. Phillips and Sandler (2015) show
that temporary closings of a commuter rail station reduces crime at neighboring stations
as criminals have reduced access to the transit network. Moreover, Ihlanfeldt (2003)
presents earlier evidence that commuter rail is associated with increased crime in low
income areas, but slightly decreased crime in high income areas. In addition to the
quantity of crime, the type of crime may also be influenced by transit. Jackson and
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Owens (2011) show that an expansion of hours for the DC subway decreased drunk
driving crimes, but increased other types of alcohol-related crimes (such as assault).26
The evidence directly on public bus transport is not as extensive. Qin (2013)
provides descriptive evidence from Cincinnati showing elevated crime at bus stops.
Loukaitou-Sideris (1996) provides earlier descriptive evidence that crime tends to cluster
around popular but relatively isolated bus stops. It may not be the bus stop per se but
rather that they are an example of infrastructure that causes congregations of people in
public spaces (Loukaitou-Sideris, et. al. 2002). Evidence shows that police officers whose
patrol routes were moved onto bus routes during a police initiative dramatically increased
their number of arrests (Newton, et.al. 2004). As is clear, these studies do not attempt to
provide rigorous causal evidence.
Survey evidence shows that riders on a dedicated university bus service report
mixed sentiments regarding its influence on crime (Elam, et. al. 2006). While some
survey respondents felt it provided safer transport, others felt it encouraged drinking by
students making them more susceptible to crime, or more likely to commit crime. This
survey evidence reflects a bus service for a university without a safe ride program. Weber
(2014) uses arguably exogenous changes in the hours of a public university safe ride
service to show that when the program is open, crime is lowered. Thus, policy makers
might worry about the advent of transportation alternatives that reduce the use of safe
rides. We are the first to estimate the influence of adding a dedicated university bus
service on reported crime, and we do so in a context in which an existing safe ride
program serves the same population.
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In what follows, Section 2 details the case study describing the university, its
neighborhood, and its transit programs. This section also describes the data that were
collected. Section 3 presents the methodology used to investigate the influence of the new
student bus service on university neighborhood crime. The results are presented in
Section 4. The results show that the advent of bus service reduced the use of the safe ride
program. Nonetheless, crime in the university neighborhood falls relative to the control.
Despite the substitution between programs, the reduction in crime is actually
concentrated along the bus routes. Section 5 provides a series of robustness checks and
Section 6 concludes and suggests further research.

2. Description of the Intervention and Data
The subject neighborhood surrounds Marquette University, an urban Catholic
university on the west side of downtown Milwaukee Wisconsin that enrolls
approximately 12,000 students. The campus blends into governmental and business
buildings on its east side but on other sides is surrounded by residential neighborhoods
that house students. These neighborhoods have relatively high crime rates. Historically,
the university has undertaken a variety of initiatives to protect students including moving
academic buildings and fraternities closer to the core of the campus, increasing housing
immediately on campus and developing student transit programs.27 The safe ride
program began in 1990 as the Local Intercampus Mobile Operation (LIMO). The LIMO
safe ride program continues to transport Marquette students, faculty and staff with valid
ID within an area around campus, spanning a total area of about 60 blocks. A rider calls
LIMO, a shuttle is sent the address and takes the rider to his or her destination. Both the
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pickup and destination must be within the 60 block boundary. The area of safe ride
program is identified by darkened area in Figure 3.
Note that these boundaries have remained constant with one modest exception. In
September of 2008 the boundary was expanded to include two additional blocks
identified by dark blue in Figure 3. This change reflected an increase in private student
housing in those two blocks. We will be careful to try a variety of robustness checks to
account for this modest change, but find that our results are largely insensitive to how we
deal with this expansion. We emphasize that our primary interest is how the advent of the
bus service influences crime and the bus service does not go through or near the two
blocks. Nonetheless, we explore the role of the expansion to make sure that it does not
confound our findings.
The LIMO program runs daily around the year from 5pm-3am (5pm - 4am on
academic weekends). The program uses vans for transport and keeps one or more vans in
reserve in case of break-downs or unusual demand. The safe ride program averages
around 5,000 rides a week across the entire year, both when school is in and out of
session. It has shown substantial growth since its inception. Indeed, the growing demand
for safe ride services convinced the university it should augment it with a cheaper fixedroute bus service.
The fixed route bus service began in March of 2008 and can again be used by
students, faculty and staff with valid identification. It consists of two routes which cross
the width of the safe ride program area. Each route is a loop of about 1.5 to 2 miles in
length. The routes do not trace the perimeter of the safe ride area but more nearly run
through the heart of the area along arterial roads. The hours of the bus service exactly
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match those of the safe ride program and it has seen substantial use. Approximately 1000
rides a week are provided by the dedicated bus service.
As crime can exhibit both secular and cyclical patterns, we sought a control that
most nearly matched our treatment jurisdiction. While we show results using alternative
controls, our primary control uses the only other university in the downtown area, the
Milwaukee School of Engineering (MSOE). The control neighborhood around MSOE is
somewhat smaller in area but includes the Water Street entertainment district known for
elevated crime. Like the area around Marquette the neighborhood includes residential
areas with student housing and blends into the office and government buildings of
downtown. MSOE enrolls around 3000 students and maintains a long-standing safe ride
program that has serviced our control neighborhood throughout the study period.

2.1 Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics:
Weekly crime data comes from the Milwaukee Police Department (MPD) through
an online tool called COMPASS.28 The data includes the address of the crime, date and
time of the crime and the broad type of crime. This service complements written records
and has been available since January 2005. Critically, this predates the initiation of the
bus service we examine. It does, however, come well after the long-standing safe ride
program. Thus, this data allows studying the influence of the bus service on crime given
the existence of the safe ride program. The records provide no personal information about
victims or perpetrators.29
Using GIS software, the crime records are matched to geographical areas. The
treatment area mimics the Marquette University safe ride service boundaries and the
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control area mimics the MSOE safe ride service boundaries. The areas include all legal
parcels that are completely within or along the service boundaries. The crime counts are
the total weekly crime measured separately within the two respective areas. We face no
issue of zero inflation as only a single observation has a crime count of zero across the
entire time interval and both areas.
As part of the objective is to examine the potential for crime relocating within the
treatment safe ride area, we also make use of a geographic division within that area. The
area along the bus route is contrasted with the remainder of the safe ride area (again see
Figure 3). To focus on the possibility of substitution we develop a bus route area that
includes only those properties along the actual routes. We later add the areas interior to
the routes as a robustness check. The primary data window is roughly centered on the
advent of the bus lines and runs from January 2005 to the January 2012. Again, we alter
this to test for robustness.
Weather data are collected as controls. Weather may influence both the weekly
demand for campus transit services and crime. Certainly, it is well known that snow and
cold temperatures are associated with lower rates of urban crime and, especially, robbery
and other street crime (Falk, 1952; Anderson, 1989; Cohn, 1990; Jacob et al., 2004;
Tompson and Bowers 2015). The weather indicators we collect are the minimum
temperature for the week and the average daily snow on the ground for each week. These
are taken from the nearest National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
weather station. We experiment with a variety of alternative weather measures but with
no real change in the pattern of results. Additional controls identify the three terms of the
academic calendar for each university as classes being in session may also influence both
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rides and crime (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003).30 Again, we note the transit services runs year
round.
Finally, for some specifications we will be interested in the actual ride data from
Marquette University. We know the number of rides given each week in both the safe
ride program and on the bus route. These, and the remainder of descriptive statistics, are
shown in Table 12 and we note that there are about 45 crimes per week averaged across
the Marquette university neighborhood.

3. Methodology
The primary research objective is to determine the influence of the bus service on
crime in the urban neighborhood around Marquette University. The secondary objective
is to examine the possible relocation of crime within the treated university neighborhood.
In examining this secondary objective, we initially show that the new bus service
corresponds with a decrease in the number of safe rides given. This fuels our inquiry of
the impact of the bus service on crime and the distribution of that crime.
To examine the policy influence we estimate a series of difference-in-difference
estimates that compare the weekly crime counts before and after the bus service. These
first compare crime in the treated university neighborhood to crime in the control
neighborhood, as the new bus service is added to the existing safe ride program in the
treated neighborhood. This gives rise to a traditional difference-in-difference
specification:
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in which the dependent variable is the crime count in neighborhood i at time t. In our
initial specification, the treated neighborhood is the entire Marquette University safe ride
area, and for inference robust standard errors are used (Bertrand, et al. 2002).
The specification includes three types of controls. First, crime varies with weather
and so the weekly average snow on the ground (mm) and weekly minimum temperature
(°C) are included. Second, crime can vary in the neighborhoods with the class schedule of
the relevant university (Weber 2014). To account for this the weeks in which each of the
three academic terms meet for each university are included as dummies and interacted
with the neighborhood.31 Third, we directly address the likely cycles and trends by
including 51 weekly time dummies and a time trend. The focus in the initial specification
is the magnitude and significance of β2, which measures the impact of the policy on the
treated Marquette University neighborhood relative to the control.
We next break down the difference-in-difference estimate to contrast crime along
the new bus lines directly with crime in the control. This is augmented by contrasting the
crime in the safe ride area, but not along the bus lines, directly with crime in the control.
Finally, we examine crime exclusively within the treated neighborhood to determine if
the new bus service shifted the location of crime toward the bus line routes. A series of
robustness exercises are then presented.
Figure 4 compares a simple moving average of the crime counts for the treated
Marquette University neighborhood with crime in the MSOE control neighborhood. The
vertical line indicates the introduction of the new bus service. The figure shows the
cycles over the year that we control for in our estimates, as crime routinely increases
during fall and spring weeks. The Marquette university area has routinely higher crime
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counts than the control, but is also a larger geographic area. The spline functions show
crime counts fall substantially in the treated neighborhood after the introduction of the
bus service and become more nearly similar to the counts in the control. Other than this
decline, there appears to be no secular pattern in the crime counts in the treated
neighborhood. There does appear to be a slight downward trend in counts for the control
neighborhood, causing us to explore differential trends in our estimation.
While the visual evidence in Figure 4 suggests that crime declines with the advent
of the bus line in the treated neighborhood relative to the control, it presents no evidence
on the statistical significance of that decline or on the possible concentration of crime
along the bus routes. We now turn to the statistical evidence on these issues.

4. Estimation Results
To set the stage for our investigation we examine whether the new bus service
may have reduced the number of students using the safe ride program. We note that the
growing use of the safe ride program and the associated growth in expenses was a stated
factor in introducing the bus service. In Table 13 the number of rides provided weekly is
regressed against a simple time trend and the advent of the bus service. In this basic
specification the advent of the bus service is associated with a decline in ridership for the
safe ride program of about 1700 rides per week, about 35 percent of the average weekly
rides. The results in column 2 control for our explanatory variables and those in column 3
also add weekly dummies. These additions do not meaningfully change the estimated
magnitude. The 1700 fewer weekly rides provided by the safe ride program may well
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have saved money but it also raises concerns over an association between the advent of
the bus service, reduced safe rides and crime.
Issues of crime relocation can be tricky. On the one hand, the bus may
concentrate victims along the route as discussed. Yet, the reduction in demand for the
safe-rides may actually improve its influence on crime in those regions far away from the
bus route. With many students taking the bus, the waiting time for such more distant safe
rides could be shortened actually increasing the number of such more distant rides. Thus,
at the same time that one might anticipate more waiting outside and walking near the bus
routes, there could simultaneously be less walking in the more remote areas. To the
extent that either of these are true, the distribution of crime could move away from distant
areas toward the bus line. This shift could remain true even as overall crime declines.
The first column of Table 14 presents the simple difference-in-difference estimate
of the influence of the new bus line on crime in the treated neighborhood, relative to the
control neighborhood. The coefficient on the interaction indicates that crimes decline by
about 6 a week in the treatment neighborhood. Using the robust standard error, this is
highly significant. As the mean crime level before the bus service was about 45 crimes
per week, this represents a large reduction of about 13 percent. The other estimates in that
column show that the treatment area tends to have higher crime counts (Figure 4) and that
the period after the policy has slightly lower crime counts.
Column 2 adds controls for weather and for school sessions. There are three terms
for each university interacted with neighborhood as the term dates are not identical. The
coefficients on the controls indicate that crime is lowest in the summer when there are
fewer students and highest in the fall and winter terms, when students are plentiful. The
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arrival of new students, who are not yet accustomed to the neighborhood and campus life,
may be responsible for the comparatively higher crime in fall (Weber 2014). Reflecting
the typical pattern, crime declines in inclement weather as indicated by the significant
positive on temperature. The inclusion of these relevant controls does not change the
estimated influence of the bus service in reducing crime. Column 3 adds 51 weekly
dummies to capture the evident cyclicality, and to recognize that crime may vary with
holidays or events in the school calendar. A variety of the individual week coefficients
take significance and the entire vector of weekly controls is jointly significant at a 10
percent level. Critically, their inclusion leaves the difference-in-difference coefficient
largely unchanged. Moreover, replacing weekly controls with broader monthly controls
also results in no meaningful change in the policy estimate.
There appeared to be a modest secular decline in the crime count for the control
that was not evident in the treatment. We show in column 4 that a single time trend takes
a negative but insignificant coefficient and leaves the influence of the bus service
unchanged. Allowing a differential time trend in column 5 shows that the negative trend
for the control neighborhood is statistically significant and offset by a positive (but
insignificant) coefficient for the treatment neighborhood. The differential trend model not
only fits the data better but it generates a substantial movement in the estimated policy
influence. The advent of the new bus line now emerges as much more important. The
estimate now indicates that following the new bus service crimes in the treatment
neighborhood fell by over 11 crimes per week.32 This is a 24 percentage point decline in
crime counts in the treatment neighborhood.
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We recognize the count nature of the dependent variable and in Table 24,
Appendix B, show a variety of alternative specifications. We estimate the log of the
count, the Poisson estimate and the negative binomial. These are each compared to the
linear specification shown in the first column. The 24 percent reduction shown in that
first column is matched by a significant 27 percent reduction in the log estimate and very
similar magnitudes in the Poisson and negative binomial. While the latter suggests there
is significant underdispersion, the estimated difference-in-difference coefficient is
virtually identical in the Poisson and in the negative binomial. We again note there is
only one week with zero crimes and that inflation is not an issue. For ease of
interpretation we continue to present the linear results but note that none of the critical
findings are altered when using these alternatives.
Table 15 examines the influence of the new bus service on crime along the bus
route area and within the remainder of safe ride area. It contrasts each of these areas with
the control neighborhood. The first column reproduces the final column of Table 14
showing the significant decline within the entire treatment neighborhood. The second
column focuses on the crime in the treatment neighborhood that is along the bus routes
and reveals a significant decline of 7 crimes per week relative to the control. Thus, there
appears to be no evidence that the bus route has concentrated crime. Instead, it seems
that the additional eyes and ears of the bus lines have outweighed the potential hazards of
additional waiting and the concentration of potential victims. There is no evidence from
this estimate that safety concerns are warranted at least for this small scale neighborhood
transit program.
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The final column in Table 15 examines the remainder of the safe ride
neighborhood away from the bus route. As we have suggested, the new bus route has a
potentially ambiguous influence on crime in this area. The estimate in the final column
suggests an insignificant decline of between 4 and 5 crimes per week relative to the
control. At minimum, there is no evidence that crime has increased and the suggestion
that the safe-ride program can concentrate on more remote services and lower crime
remains a possibility. Viewed this way, the more than 11 crime reduction in the
treatment neighborhood could be seen as divided with approximately 7 of those
happening along the bus route and the remainder in the safe-ride only area.
Table 16 directly compares crime along the bus routes to that in the safe ride only
area. We do not suggest that the safe ride only area is a control. Indeed, we have
explicitly recognized that crime in both areas are likely to be influenced by the policy.
Instead, these estimates are simply designed as another examination of whether or not
crime in the treatment area has been concentrated along the bus routes. The first column
indicates that post policy period has lower crime across the entire Marquette University
neighborhood as the previous estimates (relative to the control) have suggested.
Critically, the estimate indicates there is no statistical difference in the influence of the
policy on the two regions within the neighborhood. In short, there is no evidence that
relative location of crime has changed with the advent of the bus service. Adding
additional controls for weather, school sessions, and weeks of the year does not change
this uniformity in the policy's impact. Similarly, accounting for expansion and time
trends makes very little difference.33 The estimates in Table 16 show that the new bus
routes have not concentrated crime.
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5. Robustness and Heterogeneity
We now conduct a series of robustness checks and examine for heterogeneous
treatment influences. The first column of Table 17 simply reproduces the key results from
the previous section showing a decline of more than 11 weekly crimes in the treatment
neighborhood relative to the control. It also shows the absence of any evidence that
crime becomes concentrated along the bus route.
The second column reproduces the same series of estimates but imagines a false
treatment date one year prior to the policy. If long term factors other than the bus service
cause crime to be failing in the treatment neighborhood, one might anticipate that the
false treatment date will perform similarly to the actual treatment date. The coefficient
on the false policy date for the treatment neighborhood is insignificantly different from
that in the control. Moreover, there is no evidence with the false treatment date that
crime fell along the bus route. Indeed, the critical coefficients are insignificant in all
specifications. This result suggests that the significance of the true policy is not
coincidental. As a further check, the third column uses a false treatment date of one year
after the actual policy date. Again, there is no evidence of any influence providing
further reassurance.
The fourth column of Table 17 examines the impact of adding two lead periods,
one for six-months before the policy and a second for a year to six months before the
policy. These lead periods are also interacted with the treatment area, and capture any
variation in crime that occurs prior to the introduction of the bus service. The interactions
are typically insignificant but more importantly including the new variables never
materially changes the estimated policy influence. Despite the leads, the bus service still
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significantly reduces crime by about 11 counts per week. There remains no evidence of
crime concentrating along the bus routes. The decrease in crime along the routes remains
significant and of roughly similar size. The inclusion of the leads highlights the
possibility raised earlier that the bus service could also reduce crime in the safe ride only
area by freeing up this service for more distant users. The reduction in crime counts for
the safe ride only area looks similar to that along the bus route.
The fifth column of Table 17 adopts an entirely different control neighborhood.
While the area around another university near downtown (our preferred control) is in
many ways more comparable, we complement it with a control that has no university
avoiding issues of academic calendars and the possibility that MSOE undertook actions
we are not aware of that kept crime constant. The Bay View neighborhood on
Milwaukee’s south side consists disproportionately of younger residents, many just out of
college. At the same time it is not a typical neighborhood for college students to live in (it
is more than four miles away) suggesting that it is independent of the transit decisions of
Marquette. Again, we use the start of the bus service as the policy period and compare
crime within the treated neighborhood to that in Bay View. The estimates indicate that
the policy generates a large and significant decline of 15 crimes per week in the treatment
neighborhood.34 There is a significant decline in crime along the bus route and, again, no
evidence of crime concentrating along the bus route. As we have seen in some earlier
specifications, there is a modestly significant reduction in crime in the safe ride only area.
In short, the change of control neighborhoods reinforces our earlier evidence that the bus
service is effective in reducing crime both in the overall neighborhood and along its
route.
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Table 18 provides additional robustness checks. Again, the first column shows the
primary results from Tables 14, 15 and 17. Column 2 recognizes that some reported
crimes are unlikely to be influenced by the bus service. These potentially irrelevant
crimes include such things as counterfeiting, embezzlement and wire fraud.35 While there
are relatively few reports of such crimes in the university neighborhood, it seems that
they should not vary with the advent of the bus service. When dropping potentially
irrelevant offences, the estimated influence of the bus service remains virtually identical.
The new service remains associated with a significant reduction of 11 crimes per week in
the entire neighborhood and 7 crimes a week along the bus route. There continues to be
no evidence of crime concentrating along the routes.
Column 3 considers the potential relevance of the modest expansion to the safe
ride program. While the previous estimates simply omit crimes in the expansion (two
blocks at the northern boundary of the treatment neighborhood), here we include the
crime occurring in the expansion area. The expansion occurred in September of 2010,
sixteen months after the start of the bus service. If we leave the specification unchanged
but simply count all crimes in the expansion area over the study period, the result remains
a significant decline of 13.5 crimes per week in the expanded university neighborhood
relative to the control. This larger reduction occurs on modestly larger base of 49 crimes
per week. The slightly larger decline reflects a decline of the original magnitude along
the bus route and a larger decline in safe ride only area which included the expansion. As
a second test, we include a separate control for the post-expansion period. This returns
an unchanged reduction of 13.5 crimes per week. Finally, we augment this second
specification with an interaction of the expansion period dummy and the treatment
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neighborhood. The coefficient on the new interaction is negative and that on the
expansion dummy is essentially zero. The resulting decline in crimes associated with the
bus service grows to approximately 17 per week but there remains no evidence of crime
concentrating along the bus route.36
Column 4 presents estimates that enlarge the definition of the bus routes to
include all area interior to the routes. This highlights the possibility that the area encircled
by the bus service receives important treatment. It divides the university neighborhood
into two contiguous regions. This redefinition provides only modest changes. Obviously
the overall influence on the entire treatment neighborhood is unchanged. The newly
enlarged bus area shows a negative and significant reduction of 9 crimes a week. The
reduced safe ride area again shows an insignificant reduction of about 4 crimes a week.
The policy reduces crime and seems to especially do so near the bus service.
Several efforts were made to examine heterogeneous treatment impacts. We
explored whether there existed different influences during hot and cold weather but could
not identify such a difference. Similarly, we found no distinct differences based on snow
cover or by academic term. We recognize that additional treatment heterogeneity mays
exist by type of rider (women vs. men for example). Unfortunately, the crime data does
not record personal information such as gender or age. Moreover, the bus service does
not track the characteristics of its users.
We did, however, find substantial differences in the policy influence by day of the
week. Table 19 provides a separate estimate for Friday night, Saturday and Sunday and
compares that to an estimate for the remainder of the week. This comparison suggests
that the policy impact is concentrated on the weekend. Indeed, the vast majority of the
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overall reduction in crimes (approximately 76 percent) happens in the weekend despite
being a smaller share of the week. This could make sense if students use the service for
weekend leisure activities (including drinking) and this is when they are most vulnerable.
In fact, Playboy magazine awarded Marquette University the dubious honor of the "Best
Catholic Party University" (Playboy 2010) suggesting that this particular leisure activity
may be common. The results in Table 19 also suggest that crime decreases both along the
bus route and in the safe ride area during the weekend but provide no evidence of
significant declines during the weekdays. In sum, this argues that the new bus service
does not help provide safer transit to and from classes but could be critical for transport
associated with social activities.

6. Conclusions
We uniquely examine the influence of a dedicated university bus route on
neighborhood crime. The advent of the bus route led to a significant drop in weekly
crime relative to the control. This suggests that the bus kept students off the streets at
times when they were vulnerable and acts as additional eyes and ears. Critically, the bus
substituted for the long-standing safe ride program as fewer safe rides were given with
the advent of the bus service. Recognizing the advantage of the door-to-door safe ride, we
worried that a more dangerous transport mode replaced a safer one. Yet, we found no
evidence of this despite previous suggestions in the literature. Instead, the reduction in
crime is actually centered along the bus routes. This may reflect the fact that while some
students use the bus instead of the safe ride, others use the bus instead of walking.
Indeed, despite the substitution, the total number of students transported by both
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programs increases after the advent of the bus service. Moreover, the bus may come
sufficiently frequently that wait times are minimal and walking distances are short so that
vulnerability does not increase.
The evidence on the influence of the bus service on the safe-ride only area is
mixed. The estimated policy influence was routinely negative but significantly so only in
some specifications. It remains clear that the substitution toward bus rides did not cause
crime to increase in the safe ride area only. The suggestions that the bus service might
have actually decreased crime in the safe ride only area (say on the weekends) could
follow if the bus service freed additional safe ride capacity for those farthest away and
perhaps most vulnerable. Nonetheless, the critical point is that there was no evidence of
crime concentrating geographically as a result of new policy.
This pattern proved robust to a long series of robustness checks. The estimates
correctly lost significance when we considered false treatment dates either before or after
the true start date of the bus service. In contrast, the addition of lead periods, as well as an
alternative choice of control, did not substantially alter the results. Continued checks
revealed that the results remain robust to a narrower definition of crime and to broader
definitions of both the university area (which includes expansions) and the treatment area
within the bus route. Despite these many changes, the pattern of results consistently
shows a reduction in crime in the Marquette University neighborhood after the addition
of the bus service. There also continued to be no evidence that crime became more
concentrated along the bus routes. The influence of the bus service on crime does appear
to be concentrated on weekends when students are more likely to use transit for social
activities.

46

Chapter 3: Modeling Adversary Preference and Strategic Response
1. Introduction
The notion that terrorism may well be a rational act has found strong support in
the rational choice literature (Landes 1978, Pape 2003, Sandler 2013). In this research,
we share the view that adversaries are rational actors, and therefore at least some parts of
their attack strategy can be predicted. Moving towards that goal, we create a parametrized
model describing the behavior of two rational agents in conflict. We then fit that model to
data by a simple calibration technique. This gives us a broad picture of the otherwise
invisible effort by both sides, and a measure of the otherwise unknown ex ante difficulty
of conventional and unconventional attacks. While previous work has estimated the de
facto status of terrorists as either in a “high attack regime” or “low attack regime”
(Enders and Sandler 2002), or changes in intensity of attacks (Faria 2003, Faria and Arce
2012), this model provides an explanation of how a group may actually switch from one
type of attack to another. Using this model, the importance of military intelligence (Arce
and Sandler 2007) can be measured. This calibrated model estimates casualties when a
well-informed adversary has unusually high rates of success, or succeeds in carrying out
particularly lethal attack against a less informed defending nation.
The key to our modeling and calibration is that uncertainty is central to conflict.
For example, it is uncertain if an attack will succeed or fail.37 Even if an attack was
guaranteed success, the number of casualties is uncertain until after the fact. It is clear
from historical evidence that some attacks have been devastating, and casualties from
adversary attacks follow heavy tail distributions (Mohtadi and Murshid 2006, 2009a,
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2009b; Bohorquez, et. al. 2009, Newman, 2005, Clauset et. al. 2007). Others may not.
We carefully take into account both of these types of uncertainty.
We begin by describing the conflict model, and discussing its components and
solutions. We examine the parameters of the model: effort by both sides, and the
complexity (i.e., intrinsic difficulty) of each type of attack. We show that when initial
parameters are changed, participants respond in manner consistent with a priori
expectations. Taking this as a sign of plausibility, we then examine two sources of data
about adversary attack damages created by the University of Maryland's START Center.
The first dataset, Profiles of Incidents Involving CBRN by Non-State Actors Database
(POICN), stresses a key category of attacks that have the potential to be extreme and
catastrophic. The complementing second dataset, the Global Terrorism Database (GTD),
stresses attacks that are more conventional in nature, but nevertheless have the potential
to be large. This categorical distinction between different types of attack motivates using
two different distributions in our modeling and calibration exercise. Since both datasets
are used to jointly calibrate a single model, a key issue is the compatibility of the two
dataset. After greater discussion of both types of attacks, and the key features of each of
the datasets, we find a subset of the data to be comparable, calibrate the model to fit the
data.
In what follows, Section 2 develops the model, discusses each of the critical
unknowns that need to be evaluated, and presents comparative statics. Section 3
discusses the data set, and walks readers through critical features of each data set. Section
4 uses the data to identify the distribution for each type of large attack, and estimates the
defining parameters. Section 5 then calibrates the entire conflict model to these
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distributions, and shows the resulting set of anticipated behaviors, attack obstacles, and
quality of fit. Section 6 presents predicted casualties when attacks parameters are poorly
anticipated and prepared for by the defender. Two parameters of focus are attacks with
greater lethality than expected, or those with greater ease for the adversary than
anticipated by the government. We model these through shocks unanticipated by the
defending government. Section 7 presents concluding remarks.

2. Model
2.1 General Model Overview
The model characterizes a strategic interaction between an adversary and the
government. The two principal forms of substantial attacks that we are interested in,
unconventional attacks (CBRN), and conventional attacks (non-CBRN), capture the
nature of strategic trade-off that may be confront an adversary. An adversary who carries
out a substantial conventional attack faces a certain risk of failure and a distribution of
casualties in the event of success. The adversary’s alternate strategy is a substantial
unconventional attack (CBRN), with its own distinct profile of failure risk and casualty.
Two factors influence the probability of failure in either attack type. First, the
government establishes defensive efforts to protect against attacks. In keeping with the
conclusions of the 9/11 report (Roth et al., 2004), it seems likely that the adversary
observes the government’s protective effort level, perhaps by observing the extent of
protection of targets. Second, there are potential inherent complexities that represent
logistical, terrain, informational, and coordination obstacles associated with any attack.
This complexity is independent of the government and the adversary effort. Both
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government defensive efforts, and the complexity factors, compound to lower the chance
of a successful attack. We assume that the complexity of the operation is common
knowledge to participants (though we as researchers had to estimate it via calibration to
actual data). We later allow for adversary to have superior knowledge of the complexity
of an operation relative to the government, indicating the value of intelligence to the
government.
Observing government counterinsurgency effort, the adversary chooses its
optimal effort as a best response and the level of attack associated with a specific inherent
complexity. The government chooses optimal levels of protective effort against each
type of attack, given budgetary constraints, and keeping the reactions of the adversary in
mind.38 Previous literature has examined budget choice as a part of the conflict (Zhuang
and Bier, 2007), but here we consider budgets as a fixed and important limiting factor,
such as by Congressional decision at the start of a fiscal year. At the end of the game,
payoffs are given, and the game ends. Figure 5 shows a flowchart outlining the basic
pattern of the game:
This flowchart shows how CBRN and conventional attacks fit into the model.
Government allocates its resources to defend against the two types of attack. Adversaries
see the government’s choice, and then allocate their own resources. The attack then has a
possibility of being successful, contingent on the compounding factors of each parties’
effort, and the natural complexity of the attack type. Successful attacks lead to benefits
for the adversary, and losses for the government, in the form of casualties.
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2.2 Critical Unknowns
To account for the uncertain nature of conflict, we have included two critical
factors into our model: number of casualties from each type of attack, and probabilities of
success in each type of attack. Each unknown will be estimated by our empirical
approach. We discuss each in turn.
As a first unknown, the true importance of an attack is only clear once an attack
has been realized. Participants begin conflict with an expectation about the value of an
attack. This valuation will be found in the respective utility functions of each party. We
admit such valuations or payoff may be argued to include casualties, property damage, or
other intangible assets. In our case, we will focus on casualties, the sum of fatalities and
injuries, since we anticipate human life and health to be a dominant feature of such
evaluations, and do not wish to engage in the comparability of human life to other assets.
We again point out that these damages are likely to have heavy tails (Mohtadi and
Murshid, 2009). The expected number of casualties given that an attack is successful is
represented by the weight %&'() , %+,-. for the two types of attack. Put explicitly,
% = /0

$1

$|31

$$41 5

67

(1)

Until section 6, we will assume shared expectations about fatalities,
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As a second set of unknowns, different effort levels correspond to different
probabilities of success. A priori, the effort of each party interacts with the effort of their
opponent, and further interacts with natural complexities inherent to performing an
attack. All else equal, the probability of success will increase with adversary effort
0
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and decline with the preventive efforts of the government 0
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Some attacks may be notably challenging, such as coordinating multiple shooters. More
challenging attacks require greater logistical precision, or greater luck. As a consequence,
they are less likely to succeed than a simpler attack at a comparative level of effort. Such
attacks are marked as having a higher “complexity” 0
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We assume that the

government’s assessment of is accurate until section 6, where we consider the case that
it is wrongly assessed.
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We note that estimation of the parameters determining probability of success
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is particularly challenging. The desired

information is often either unknown or deliberately obscured.

Adversary effort is

deliberately hidden from the government and consequently to any researcher. Conversely,
the government effort may also be unknown to the adversary (and researcher). For
example, even the US Coast guard randomizes its surveillance and counter-insurgency
efforts (Ordónez, et. al., 2013). In principle such mixed strategies are not without merit,
as they keep the opponent uncertain. However, since one important contribution of this
work is to shed light on the value of better intelligence about the adversary’s potential
actions, to the government, it is more relevant to focus on uncertainty about the adversary
actions to the government than vice-versa. In the following section, we develop a model
in which we can infer the underlying effort levels of the participants, especially the
adversary, by matching theoretical variables with counterparts in actual data.
effort 0

Our model, therefore, must address the eight critical unknowns of government
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and finally the damages of successful substantial attacks 0%&'() , %+,-. 7.
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2.3 Probability of Successful Attack
We now combine the above components of an attack into a single probabilistic
form. In our model, the probability of success at type of attack
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This value can also be interpreted as the probability of damage from attack type n.
In keeping with previous literature, we will use the probability of success terminology
throughout this paper (Bier and Hausken, 2011), and the exponential functional form
matches the example of Biers, et al (2007). For an attack to succeed, the adversary must
trigger a successful attack, as shown by the first part of the product, and the government
must fail to defend, as shown in the second part of the product. The common parameter
is both attack-augmenting and defense-augmenting, since it is clear that logistical
challenges affect both parties, assisting the government and obstructing the adversary.39
Granting the assumptions that effort and complexity are positive,
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this probability has the basic properties we would expect. To begin with, at no point does
this probability rise above one or fall below zero. Next, all else being held fixed, the
typical comparative statics are clear and intuitive. First, attacks are more likely to succeed
with greater adversary effort M

NO0P,I,H7
NP

≥ 0Q. Appropriately, in the boundary case where

adversary effort is zero, the probability of a successful attack is also zero. Second, attacks
are less likely to succeed with greater government effort M

NO0P,I,H7
NI

≤ 0Q, but no finite

amount of government effort can force the probability of successful attack to zero. Last
of all, attacks are less likely to succeed as target complexity increases M
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NO0P,I,H7
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≤ 0Q. As

→ ∞, the probability of successful attack approaches zero. Again, we note that none of
these values

(,

(, (

are available to us as raw data. Instead, we only know 0. 7, the

probability of success in the real world.
We expect that rational actors would perform some mental estimate of the
probabilities of success in their decision-making process. Our model hinges on the belief
that adversaries will attempt to maximize the expected casualties from both conventional
and CBRN attacks. Conversely, the government will attempt to minimize these
casualties. We use the structure of our model, and our information about

0. 7 to provide

an estimate of the many unknowns.

2.4 Adversary Behavior
We assume that a hostile adversary will have the goal of maximizing casualties,
given some resource constraints. Rational adversaries will keep in mind their probability
of success, 0. 7, for each type of attack, and have conditional expectations, about the

mean number of casualties from a successful attack. We assume that these expectations
coming from equation 1 enter into the utility function of the adversary and later, the
government. As such, their expected utility function is the expected number of casualties
from their efforts:40
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This is subject to the simple expenditure restriction:
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We assume that the government acts as a Stackelberg leader. We justify this
assumption by noting many strategic decisions made by the government, are visible to the
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adversary. Such examples may be airport scanners, additional patrol boats, or improving
firearms for security guards (Ordónez, et al. 2013). We first solve for the best response
function of the adversary. This is derived in Appendix C, and is found to be:
∗
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We assume that the resource constraint is binding, since additional resources serve no
other purpose in our model other than investing in attacks. Thus, the remainder of the
resources are spent on CBRN type attacks:
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For simplicity and no loss of generality adversary resources are

normalized to unity. This allows us to focus on using variations in

to generate the

observed probability of success.

2.5 Interpreting the Adversary’s Best Response Function
The best response function for an attack implies the following effects, all else being held
constant (see Appendix C equations C9-C14):
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are as one would expect for a simple game.41 To

illustrate each of the three cases, consider the reactions of adversary effort in the case of
conventional weapon attacks. First, the adversary would increase effort if the expected
casualties from a successful attack increased, say from improved explosive technology or
access to superior firearms training. Second, if the government counterinsurgency effort
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increased exogenously, it would decrease the adversary effort to attack the overly
defended site.
The third result, for , shows that a reduction in complexity can direct the
adversary in either direction. If the attack experienced lower executional complexity, say
by the development of a new explosive or concealed firearm, it could increase adversary
effort by promise of success, or decrease effort by allowing effort to be diverted to other
sites. Recall that both types of attack are linked through the resource constraints. As a
consequence, substitution can occur between the two types of attack.
Noting that
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the complementary results hold for the “cross

effects” of attacks:
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The key subtlety remains the impact of complexity, . The direction of this
impact is ambiguous. The intuition is as follows: if the first type of attack becomes
complex or simple enough, the marginal benefit of adversary effort becomes small, as the
outcome for that type of attack is almost certain. This leaves a relative excess of
resources to expend on the alternative (second) attack. As a result, the direction of impact
for delta is not monotonic and depends on parameter values MNH YZC[ ⪌ 0Q . A critical
NP

\]^_

implication of this finding is that an increase in the complexity of one type of attack
offers little comfort to the government, as it may encourage adversary to pursue
alternative attack strategies that may be even more deadly (Bier, et al. 2007).
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Finally, the Appendix C confirms the adversary’s second order condition is

always satisfied for positive values of parameters %, , , , > 0, assuring the
optimality of the solutions.

2.6 Government Defensive Behavior
The government is interested in impeding the progress of the adversary. It moves
first in the context of the game, acting as a Stackelberg leader, establishing defenses prior
to the attack. We will assume that the actions of the government, and therefore, the
probability of success or failure is public knowledge. This probability enters both directly
as shown below in the government objective function as well as indirectly through the
adversary response function. The government would like to maximize its expected utility
as follows:42

/0VI 7 = %&'() 01 − 0

&'() ,

&'() , &'() 77 +

%+,-. 01 − 0

+,-. ,

+,-. , +,-. 77

(11)
Note that the government is assumed to share the same weight on the importance of an
attack with the adversary, w, i.e., the conditional expectation of an attack, given it that it
is successful. Naturally, the greater this weight is the larger in both party’s interest in the
attack, one is producing it, the other in deterring it.
The government action is naturally also subject to constraints on its expenditures:
I

=

&'()

+

+,-.

We find that the fit is best with assuming government expenditures,

(12)

I

= 1.43 As

might be expected, the solution to government maximization problem is more complex,
owing to the inclusion of

∗

, the adversary’s best response. As a consequence of
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including

∗

in the governments’ behavior, the governments’ behavior does not reduce to

a simple behavior in δ or w. Due to the intractability of the equation, we simply solve for
g* numerically in each instance.
For the relevant cases, we find that the second order condition is satisfied and we
have a maximum. Thus, the players do not have incentive to deviate from their behavior
and the resulting equilibrium is Nash. The equation for the first order condition is shown
in Appendix C (equation C20), as is the second order condition (equation C21).
In Figure 6, a graph of the numerical estimates of their behavior is shown below
for a neighborhood of values near the suspected equilibrium. We begin by first displaying
the equilibrium efforts by both parties in the conventional types of attacks, in a region of
f&'() varying from 1 to 10, and holding f+,-. constant at 2. The value of %&'() =66.7

and %+,-. =168.5 are determined later from actual data, and we assume both sides have
unitary resources. In the neighborhood of our best estimate, we find that increasing the
complexity of conventional attacks results in a reduction of effort for the adversary. The
reduction in effort by the adversary is matched by a similar reduction in effort by the
government. We note that any attack with a complexity greater than 8 is left essentially
undefended by the government. To provide a grounding for a complexity measure of 8
for the adversary, one could imagine an adversary devoting its entire effort to the attack
since the government does nothing and the site is undefended. Yet, evaluating P(.),
equation 3, with these aformentiond assumptions,

= 1,

= 0,

= 8, would provide

only about a 12% chance of success. Thus the optimal level of adversary effort at
conventional attacks will be indeed far less than unity, and the adversary’s chance of
successful conventional attacks for the equilibrium level of effort will be only near 3%.
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We next consider how changes in CBRN attack complexity changes the effort at
conventional sites in Figure 7, the cross-attack complexity. We use similar regions, this
time varying f+,-. from 1 to 10, and holding f&'() constant at 2. The value of

%&'() =66.7 and %+,-. =168.5 remain as before. To gain a better understanding of this

result, we note that the basic principle at work here is one of strategy substitution: the
government exerts no effort defending conventional attacks when the more lethal CBRN
alternative has a a very low level difficulty of 1 (not shown here). To put such an attack
into perspective, this attack would be so easy that a government could devote all its
resources to protecting a site and still fail to protect against the attack 37% of the time.44
As CBRN attacks become more difficult at the equilibrium, the government takes
advantage of the fact that it is relatively easy to defend against CBRN, and shifts effort
towards protecting against conventional attacks. The adversary also substitutes away
from increasingly difficult CBRN attacks and into the conventional attacks. We note the
government shifts effort at a faster rate as it capitalizes on increasingly efficient defense
against CBRN. The fraction of effort relative to their total resources are approximately
equal for both parties at the difficulty index of f+,-. = 5.5.

While the theoretical model provides a modest contribution by highlighting the
multifaceted effects of target complexity on terrorist behavior, a vital contribution of this
research arises from the model’s calibration to the data. We acknowledge that target
complexity and adversary effort are inherently unobservable to laypersons, but still
provide an estimate of these values. In next section, we will present the data we do have,
and note that their distributions match those we would expect from previous literature.
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3. Data
We begin with access to a very large, well known, and publicly available dataset
on conventional attacks, known as Global Terrorism Database (GTD). We also have
access to a unique dataset on unconventional CBRN types of attacks, the Profiles of
Incidents Involving CBRN by Non-state Actors Database (POICN). This newly
developed database is a detailed collection of exclusively CBRN attacks. While GTD has
initially evolved from different sources, in the more recent past it has been maintained
and greatly expanded by the START Center at the University Maryland. The POICN
data has been exclusively developed within the START Center. This has afforded us the
unique opportunity to discuss with those who maintain both databases to ensure
maximum compatibility.
To avoid double-counting we use the GTD to examine only conventional attacks,
and POCIN to examine only CBRN attacks.45 While POICN dataset includes a valuable
component associated with “thwarted” attacks or planned attacked, the GTD dataset only
captures attacks that are actually attempted. To render the two datasets comparable for
our purposes, we exclude all aborted attack plans from our POICN dataset and focus
exclusively attacks that were actually attempted, so called “out-the-door" attempts. As an
additional precaution, we only include attacks noted as being reliably documented by the
database administrators.
We focus on casualties, which includes both injuries and fatalities. We believe
this serves as a proxy for intended size of the attack, because if an adversary is willing to
injure a victim, it is likely they would be willing to see them as a fatality. Appropriately,
we do not include adversaries’ own injuries and fatalities in our count. Since we focus on

60

modeling adversaries that prioritize inflicting substantial casualties, in order to avoid
biasing our estimates we exclude attacks such as kidnappings, assassinations, or hostagetaking. This leaves us with two complementary databases of potentially substantial
attacks, one for conventional, the other for CBRN. Summary statistics for the data are
presented in Table 20.
We note that in both types of attack, the mean far outpaces the median, suggesting
the distribution of attack casualties is highly right-skewed. There appears to be a much
thicker tail for CBRN attacks than conventional attacks, but on the whole, CBRN attacks
tend to be much less frequent. We recognize that this data is best characterized by a
distribution with thick tails and a strong right skew, and take it expressly into account in
the next step.

4. Determining Mean of Successful Attacks
As we calibrate the model to the data, we first focus on the values of the weights,

%&'() and %&'() , entering the adversary and defender expected utility functions. Since

we are interested in rare but extremely high-casualty events, rather than on low-casualty
events with nonlethal motives, we restrict the relevant weights by this additional
condition as well. Thus, equation 1 is modified as follows:
% = /0

$1

$|

6 $ $1!$

$h |

6 $ $1

$41 7

(1`)

There are several probability distributions available that represent large or extreme
events. Among them, the family of extreme value (EV) distributions as well as the
associated generalized Pareto distributions stand out (see Cole 2001). Mohtadi and
Murshid (2009) were among the first to apply EV methodology to predict the likelihood
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of terrorism events.46 About the same time as the conception of the Mohtadi-Murshid
paper, Bohorquez et. al. (2009) used Pareto distribution to examine the incidence of
terrorist attacks during Iraq war. The origin of these methodologies is the Fisher-Tippett
(1928) theory of extremal distributions in which an asymptotic pattern emerges from the
set of extremes of a sequence (e.g. the distribution of the hottest months of each year in
the past century).
The use of the EV family, however, is not appropriate for our purposes here
because it leads to a great loss of observations, and we have a small sample size of our
POICN dataset. Further, we are interested in modeling all substantial attacks, rather than
simply the largest attack per week, month, or year. Instead, we will opt for using
Generalized Pareto (GP) as the distribution of choice to fit to our dataset. Fortunately
under certain conditions the equivalence of the two distributions can be in fact
established. In particular, it can be shown (Coles, et al. 2001) that if a random variable X
is any arbitrary member of the sequence of independent random variables, X 1 , X 2 ,...Xn
subject to block maxima, M n = Max{ X 1 , X 2 ,... X n } so that by the Fisher-Tippett (1928)
Theory above, Pr{M n ≤ z} ≈ G ( z ) where G(z) is the Generalized Extreme Value
distribution, then for a large enough value of a threshold, u, the probability that the
exceedance, X-u, is larger than some value, y, is given by the Generalized Pareto
distribution,


ξy

Pr{( X − u ) ≥ y | X > u} = H ( y ) = 1 − 1 +
 σ + ξ (u − µ ) 
In this distribution, ξ is the shape parameter which represents the thickness of the tail
(probability of catastrophic events), σ represents a scale parameter, and a location
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(13)

parameter µ.47 While the shape, scale and location parameters can be determined by
maximum likelihood estimation, we are required to parametrically select a threshold
value over which substantial events occur. The choice of threshold is determined by
fitting each choice in threshold to the data and then examining the QQ plots. In
Appendix D, we examine the common choices of 10, 25, and 50 casualties. Using QQ
plots and seeking a threshold value to best fit the data, we find that the threshold value of
25 casualties fits best for both GP distributions. The mean of these GP distributions,
therefore, when they exist should serve as a better estimate of the intended damage for
ambitious and successful attackers. To highlight the difference between the two types of
attack sets, we compare the means of the raw data, representing all attempted attacks, and
the means of the GP distribution, representing an estimate of the potential damage from a
substantial attack. We then show the parameters derived from fitting each of the two
types of attack to GP distributions in Table 21.
It is worth noting from this table that the mean number of casualties from
historical data is lower than the mean of the GP distribution. In part, the difference is
because the historical data includes attacks with no casualties, and those with relatively
few casualties (<25). By contrast, the GP distribution has the heavy tail which, while it is
inferred from the data, admits the possibility of attacks far more deadly than the historical
data allows. In the case of CBRN attacks, the tail is so heavy that it does not have a finite
standard deviation. Still, we are able to obtain a finite mean and this allows us to perform
our estimation and analysis moving forward. One implication of using the mean from GP
distribution, rather than directly using the historical mean, is that the point estimates of
%&'() and %+,-. more accurately reflect the idea of substantial, successful attacks.
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Ignoring small attacks and focusing on the likelihood of large attacks has one
additional advantage for our modeling: If an attack has relatively few casualties, it seems
plausible that attackers and the government consider the attack to have failed or been
prevented in some important capacity. For example, a low-casualty biological attack may
only inflict a few casualties because they failed to properly aerosol the biological agent,
or the intended release location may have been blocked by security patrols. On the other
hand, the attackers may still consider their low-casualty attack a success. If the attackers
had the goal of delivering few casualties with a biological weapon, then the attackers had
specific goals other than inflicting mass casualties, such as spreading fear (Abrahms
2008). Avoiding low intensity attacks bypasses this ambiguous definition of what
constitutes a successful attack.48

5. Estimating δ at Equilibrium
Granting the model, data, and the threshold of 25 established above, we would
like to estimate key variables of the model. As previously mentioned, critical parameters
are unobserved due to the secretive preferences of the actors. The only critical pieces of
information we have are our estimated mean casualties from each type of attack, %, and
the threshold of 25 grants us a probability of a successful substantial attack ex post,
0. 7 =

# 'j k P&lm c n ')op q +PmrPW om
# 'j k P&lm

. Using this as a baseline, we are able to establish

an estimate of the values of the unobservable parameters ,

and .

To do this, we first note that the game only requires two pieces of information to
start:

and %. Having used the data to determine %, we evaluate the outcome of the

game at many various values of the exogenously determined parameter . We then solve
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the model for values of

and , given . From there, the equilibrium probability of

successful substantial attack

0 ∗ 0 , %, 7, 0%, 7, 7, is calculated. This theoretical

probability has an empirical counterpart from the actual value which we know from the
data for both types of attack: the percentage of attacks of each type above the threshold
µ=25.49 We would like to choose

as best as possible to fit this probability for both types

of attack. Consequently, we chose a simple minimization of squared errors as our criteria
for best fit, selected for its resemblance to the classic ordinary least squares regression

and because it leads to a fit in both dimensions.50 We therefore seek the values of f( that
will minimize the error function below:
min{F

Here,

I )o( ,

f

&'() F &'() J

−

&'(),I )o( J

+F

f

+,-. F +,-. J −

+,-.,I )o( J

is the probability found from our data, f( is our exogenously chosen

estimate of , which results in

f

(F (J

}

(14)

being found from our model. Performing a simple

search of the values [1 … 10] by steps of 1 allows us to find a value of f( that

minimizes our squared error function. These search boundaries should be more than
sufficient because

G y

is much smaller than

I )o( ,

and our functional form of 0. 7, is

the product of two exponential functions.

Having found our estimated value of f( , we also can obtain estimated current

adversary expenditures, z( and the estimated optimum counter-terrorism investments,

z( . Table 22 shows all relevant values for the equilibrium solution. We evaluate them for
I

= {1,10,20,30} to consider a range of adversary/government expenditure ratios, and

find the fit clearly matches the correct probabilities and smallest error function best when
I

= 1.
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We find that the initial estimate of delta suggests different levels of complexity
parameter for different types of attack,

&'()

= 4, while

+,-.

= 2. One possible

explanation for this result is that a CBRN attack that has reached the “near-execution
stage (so called “out of the door”), is perhaps slightly simpler- deploying a bomb or
pressing a button. The difficulty of these attacks lies within the assembly of such a
device. For example, during the US anthrax scare of 2001, the creation of anthrax was
difficult, but the execution (simply mailing them) was not. On the other hand, there
seems to be many complexities and pre-existing barriers against executing large
conventional attacks. Such things like already existing local police forces, and rapidly
responding police and other emergency forces well trained for conventional attacks, may
make organized conventional attacks struggle to break the barrier of 25 casualties.
Effort at security for the government is tilted towards suppressing CBRN attacks:

&'()

= 0,

+,-.

= 1. While this is probably not to be taken as a literal 100% it is likely

that national security system heavily focuses on detection and prevention of any CBRN
attacks, rather than focusing on preparing for conventional armed skirmishes. This seems
rational given the higher number of expected casualties in large CBRN attacks, and their
comparative simplicity in execution: once they are “out the door” they are simply taken
to a crowded location and deployed.
Conversely, the adversary also invests in committing and deploying CBRN
weapons once an attack is prepared. We find that the adversary interested in substantial
attacks focuses their effort in deploying CBRN weapons.

&'()

= 0.2279,

+,-.

0.7721. The emphasis in CBRN can be attributed towards their relatively large

=

anticipated casualties, and their relative ease of deployment once out-the-door. Even
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though the government has heavily invested in protecting against CBRN, the adversary
might still inflict casualties. They can do this by emphasizing conventional weapons,
even though they are more logistically complex to use in a large attack, and have lower
anticipated casualties when successful.
While it cannot be asserted that our proposed solution perfectly matches real
investment by either party, the close fit suggests that they are at least plausible. In fact,
we correctly identify each of the probabilities of attack within an average of 2%.51

6. Consequences of Unexpectedly Large Attacks
At this point, we have estimated values for the complexity and effort levels,

f( , z ( , and z( obtained from fitting of the current observed data on actual “out-the-door”
attacks to the theory. These are the Nash equilibrium values. But in real world new
unforeseen shocks imply that the government’s guess about the behavior, the plans and
the strategies of the adversary will be inaccurate, due perhaps to imperfect intelligence
about the adversary’s capabilities. As an example, unbeknownst to the defender
government, adversary may have developed a way of delivering a successful attack with
much greater casualties than the defender government expects from past history.
Alternatively, again unbeknownst to the defender government, the adversary may have
the capability of using a new technology that would allow it to execute a relatively
complex attack with greater simplicity. We examine each of these two scenarios below.
In the first scenario, based on their own private information, adversary groups
anticipate their CBRN attack is of different severity than the mean, while the uninformed
government merely prepares for attacks at the mean level of severity. For illustration we
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consider a case of underestimation here, where /0%+,-. | 5 8 $

/0%+,-. | 9 8
1,

P

= 1,

I

7. Again we use the equilibrium values of:

7≠

&'()

= 2,

= 1, %&'() = 66.7, and %+,-. = 168.5 from Table 22 as the base

+,-.

=

conditions, due to their superior fit quality. We then consider that the adversary is better
informed than the government as to the true realization of %+,-. . To model this, we

assume that %+,-. is revealed to the adversary prior to the attack, but after the

government has already established defenses, and the government does not know such a
revelation is occurring. For the sake of simplicity, the government is considered to be
entirely unaware of such a potentiality. To capture the variation in potentially realizable
outcomes, we imagine %+,-. could range from -60% to +60% of the expected value of
%+,-. . It is shown in Figure 8 how this information gap affects the outcome, or the

casualty count. Obviously, as the realization of %+,-. shown to the adversary increases,
so does the expected number of CBRN casualties. However, the CBRN casualties

increase at a rate faster than the simple increase in %+,-. . Conversely, the total number
of casualties from conventional attacks declines, and eventually reaches zero. The net
number of casualties, from both types of attack together, gradually climbs at an
accelerating rate until it because linear and remains such indefinitely.
As shown by the subsequent Figure 9, this decline in conventional casualties, and
faster-than-linear increase in CBRN casualties, can be explained by the adversary
recognizing the unique opportunity for CBRN attacks against the misinformed
government, and thus focusing more effort on CBRN attacks. As such, the growth in
CBRN casualties is due to both the higher lethality and the increased adversary
investment in CBRN. The increase in total casualties is softened by the reduction in
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conventional casualties, but with very large increases in CBRN casualties, the adversary
will entirely divest from conventional attacks. Again, the government is relatively
unprepared for such attacks, having not been informed about any potential changes in
casualty counts.

Next consider the case where the lethality 0%7 of potential attacks are again well

understood and fixed, but complexity of a potential attack 0 7 by the adversary is not

well understood by the defender government. In this scenario, the adversary has access to
a technique or technology unforeseen by the defending government that simplifies the
process of attack. An example may be bringing a firearm into a secure building
becoming far simpler through improved plastic technology. Such improvements, if not
anticipated by the defender government, would falsely lead the government to believe
that a type of attack is too complex for the adversary to invest heavily in. The
overconfidence leads to an inferior defense of the target, allowing the adversary to
opportunistically take advantage of superior information, and inflict additional casualties.
Compared to the correctly informed setting, the target society will experience larger
casualties.
Figure 10 and 11 depict this scenario of unusually simple or complex attacks,
again using the same equilibrium parameters identified in Table 22 as a base. Again, we
then vary the value of our parameter of interest, this time

+,-. ,

for the adversary, but

only make this change after the government has established defenses, and without
foresight of this change on the part of the government. Figure 10 plots the total number of
casualties that will occur if the government plans its defense based on a faulty estimation
of what the government estimates the adversary capabilities for carrying out a complex

69

CBRN attack. Notice the range of casualties after mis-estimation are potentially much
larger than the casualties in Figure 8 . This suggests that estimating the complexity of the
attack correctly is of much greater importance than correctly assessing the impending
casualties. If both are inaccurate by a large proportion, the casualties from inaccuracies
in complexity far outweigh those of a proportionally equivilant error in lethality. The
complexity parameter entering exponentially into the probability of success (see equation
3) plays a much larger role in the value of that probability, and thus of the expected
number of causalities. We note that there appears to be an eventual spike in conventional
casualties when the complexity of CBRN attacks is very low, and turn to the behavior of
the adversary in Figure 11 to identify why.
In Figure 11, we note that the adversary’s efforts are not shifting purely in one
direction. As a CBRN attack becomes less complex from our equilibrium values, the
adversary initially invests more into the attack. This is because they see greater marginal
returns for their effort within a CBRN attack as it becomes simpler to perform. However,
as the attack complexity reaches very low levels, the success of the CBRN attack is
nearly assured. Additional effort towards CBRN at this point does not substantially
increase the probability of a successful CBRN attack. Adversaries then take some of their
resources and divert them away from the nearly assured CBRN event and towards the
potentially contentious conventional efforts. The result is that net casualties continue to
increase, as that there is not only extremely likely a large number of CBRN casualties,
but it will be further supplemented by the adversary’s ability to assign surfit effort from
CBRN into conventional attacks.
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In sum, we have identified that a goverment error in anticipating the complexity
of an attack can result in substantially more casualties. An immediate policy implication
is that intelligence efforts should focus on establishing (and increasing) the obstacles
opponents face in performing an attack, rather than assessing how catastrophic the
consequences of a large attack might be.

7. Conclusion
We have developed a sequential game of conflict between a government and an
adversary organization. This model is used to analyze the strategic choices of effort
allocation between large CBRN and large conventional threats. Using this model, we
match theory and data by estimating a key parameter of the model that describes the
relative complexity of each type of attack. We do so by minimizing sum squared error
between the observed and the theoretical probability of success in an attack in a model
where all other starting parameters can be identified beforehand. With this parameter
estimate, we are then able to back out the Nash equilibrium values of effort by both sides.
Finally, anticipating that the government will eventually be caught unaware by
some shock, we model the consequences of such unfortunate surprises in attack
complexity and lethality. This forecast of casualties identifies the scale of potential
future disasters when the attack size or its complexity are grossly misestimated ex anti.
We identify that while it may be important to measure changes in the size of incoming
attacks, the most critical challenge for the defending government is to accurately estimate
the complexity of in the execution of the attack.
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Figures
Figure 1: BOSS Operating Range

Notes: Marked Points Represent UWM Facilities, and the dark boarder represents the
boundary of BOSS operations.
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Figure 2: Plot of Weekly Crime and Hours Open

Notes: Displays 5-week moving averages
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Figure 3: Boundaries of the Safe Ride Program and the Bus Routes

Notes: The entire blue area outline in dashed blue line is service by the safe-ride program.
The purple and dark blue lines through the center are the dedicated bus routes.
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Figure 4: Weekly Crime Counts across the Data Window

2005w1

2006w1

2007w1

2008w1 2009w1
Year

Crime Count, MU Neighborhood
MU Neighborhood, Pretreatment
MU Neighborhood, post-treatment

2010w1

2011w1

2012w1

Crime Count, Control
Control, Pretreatment
Control, post-treatment

Notes: Weekly crime counts are shown as a 13 week moving average. The 13 week
moving average is not evaluated across the treatment start date, represented by the
vertical line.
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Figure 5: The Model of Government Defense Against Adversary Attacks
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Figure 6: Equilibrium Effort in Response to Attack Complexity
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Figure 7: Equilibrium Effort in Response to Cross Attack
Complexity
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Figure 8: Number of expected casualties with respect to size of shock to CBRN Casualties
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s
Figure 9: Effort with respect to size of shock to CBRN casualties
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Figure 10: Casualties occurring in response to a shock in CBRN complexity

81

Figure 11: Adversary effort in response to a shock in CBRN complexity

82

Figure 12, Appendix D: Quantile-Quantile Plots of Conventional Attack Casualties at Thresholds of 10, 25, and 50
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Figure 13, Appendix D: Quantile-Quantile Plots of CBRN Attack Casualties at Thresholds of 10, 25, and 50
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Tables
Table 1: Number of Changes between Open and Closed by Hour of Week
Hour Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday
0
28
26
23
21
27
27
30
Morning
1
20
18
16
16
20
20
20
17
4
5
3
3
3
3
4
18
26
27
23
29
27
27
28
19
27
38
24
30
28
28
29
Evening
20
27
38
24
30
28
28
29
21
27
38
24
30
28
28
29
22
27
38
24
30
28
30
29
23
27
24
22
28
28
30
29
nd
th
Note: The hours from the 2 to 16 hour of the day were suppressed because the
program was always closed during those hours
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Data
Variable
Rides Given
Program is Open (1 if Open, 0 otherwise)
Daily Precipitation (cm)
Daily Snowfall (cm)
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)
Daily Minimum Temperature (degrees C)
Total Crime
School in Session (1 if Open, 0 otherwise)
Total Probability of Crime
Note: Averages are taken over the entire data set.
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Mean Std. Dev.
15.266
29.661
0.248
0.432
0.249
0.728
0.048
0.233
0.267
0.637
4.779
10.38
0.934
1.647
0.914
0.281
47.30%
-

Table 3: Poisson Regression of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region
(1)
-0.09102
(1.84)*

(2)
(3)
(4)
Open
-0.08757 -0.0848 -0.15179
(1.74)*
(1.68)* (3.56)***
School in Session
0.16624
0.17256
0.18292
(4.49)*** (4.63)*** (5.35)***
Daily Precipitation (cm)
-0.01742 -0.0186
(1.42)
(1.47)
Daily Snowfall (cm)
-0.10731 -0.09934
(2.64)*** (2.46)**
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)
-0.02491 -0.02535
(1.21)
(1.21)
o
Daily Minimum Temperature (C )
0.00505
0.00437
(2.29)**
(1.96)*
Constant
-0.04617 -0.20954 -0.15056
(1.15)
(3.55)*** (2.56)**
N
30,648
30,648
30,648
30,648
Clustering by Hour of Week
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Month Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Hour of Week Fixed Effects (168)
Yes
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option
200 times to avoid overdispersion. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 4: OLS Regression of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region
(1)
-0.08307
(1.82)*

(4)
Open
-0.12474
(3.25)***
School in Session
0.15954
(5.54)***
Daily Precipitation (cm)
-1.73386
(1.51)
Daily Snowfall (cm)
-6.78262
(2.51)**
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)
-1.92437
(1.19)
o
Daily Minimum Temperature (C )
0.04085
(2.04)**
Constant
0.95488
0.95488
0.86347
(24.74)** (16.11)**
(18.40)**
*
*
*
N
30,648
30,648
30,648
Clustering by Hour of Week
Yes
Yes
Yes
Month Controls
Yes
Yes
Hour of Week Fixed Effects (168)
Yes
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option
200 times to avoid overdispersion. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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(2)
-0.08012
(1.72)*
0.14422
(4.56)***

(3)
-0.07765
(1.67)*
0.15119
(4.74)***
-1.65092
(1.47)
-7.50984
(2.79)***
-1.86833
(1.20)
0.04694
(2.35)**
0.81339
(16.81)**
*
30,648
Yes
Yes

Table 5: Poisson Regression of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region Among
Typically Open Hours
(1)
-0.14664
(2.48)**

(2)
(3)
(4)
Open
-0.14923 -0.14165 -0.1605
(2.38)** (2.21)** (3.45)***
School in Session
0.32689
0.33163
0.33355
(4.36)*** (4.40)*** (4.54)***
Daily Precipitation (cm)
-0.02248 -0.02545
(1.07)
(1.15)
Daily Snowfall (cm)
-0.25187 -0.24199
(3.27)*** (2.98)***
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)
-0.01018 -0.01183
(0.38)
(0.43)
Daily Minimum Temperature (Co)
0.00777
0.00712
(2.28)** (2.17)**
Constant
0.00945
-0.327
-0.24743
(0.15)
(3.04)*** (2.28)**
N
30,648
30,648
30,648
30,648
Clustering by Hour of Week
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Month Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Hour of Week Fixed Effects (168)
Yes
Dropped Hours 2am-4pm (inclusive)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option
200 times to avoid overdispersion. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 6: ZIP Regression of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region Among Typically
Open Hours
Marginal
Effects
-0.13720
(2.15)**
0.32779
(4.36)***
-0.024
(1.17)
-0.2097
(2.30)**
0.00015
(0.01)
0.00822
(2.41)**
11,493
Yes
Yes

Marginal Effects with
Dummies
Open
-0.13443
(3.04)***
School in Session
0.26084
(6.00)***
Daily Precipitation (cm)
-0.02163
(0.93)
Daily Snowfall (cm)
-0.1777
(2.29)**
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)
-0.00344
(0.11)
o
Daily Minimum Temperature (C )
0.00699
(2.16)**
N
11,493
Clustering by Hour of Week
Yes
Month Controls
Yes
Hour of Week Dummies Included (168)
Yes
Dropped Hours 2am-4pm (inclusive)
Yes
Yes
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option
200 times to avoid overdispersion. In both regressions, the sample was restricted to hours
in which the program was typically open. The second column represents the results from
distributing the tasks onto the larger computer in order to support the addition of
dummies to the estimation. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 7: Poisson Regressions of the Two Types of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride
Region

Open
School in Session
Daily Precipitation (cm)
Daily Snowfall (cm)
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)
Daily Minimum Temperature (Co)

Social and Property
Crimes
-0.14011
(3.11)***
0.16874
(4.46)***
-0.0088
(0.69)
-0.09855
(2.28)**
-0.03488
(1.49)
0.00348
(1.37)
30,648
Yes
Yes

Personal Crimes
-0.1818
(2.35)**
0.2405
(3.65)***
-0.0589
(1.91)*
-0.10304
(0.90)
0.01334
(0.40)
0.00791
(2.00)**
30,648
Yes
Yes

N
Clustering by Hour of Week
Month Controls
Hour of Week Dummies Included
(168)
Yes
Yes
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option
200 times to avoid overdispersion. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 8: Poisson Regressions of the Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region with a
Weekend Interaction Term
Open
Open * Weekend

(1)
-0.07129
(1.32)
-0.07190
(0.95)

School in Session
Daily Precipitation (cm)
Daily Snowfall (cm)
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)

(2)
(3)
-0.06925 -0.06773
(1.28)
(1.25)
-0.06675 -0.06243
(0.92)
(0.86)
0.16516
0.17153
(4.49)*** (4.64)***
-0.01772
(1.44)
-0.10638
(2.60)***
-0.02496
(1.22)

Daily Minimum Temperature
(Co)
Constant

-0.04617
(1.15)
30,648
Yes

-0.20870
(3.54)***
30,648
Yes
Yes

(4)
-0.16965
(3.32)***
0.06278
(0.75)
0.18315
(5.35)***
-0.01856
(1.47)
-0.09913
(2.46)**
-0.02527
(1.20)

0.00496

0.00439

(2.25)**
-0.15035
(2.55)**
30,648
Yes
Yes

(1.97)**

N
30,648
Clustering by Hour of Week
Yes
Month Controls
Yes
Hour of Week Fixed Effects
Yes
(168)
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option
200 times to avoid overdispersion. The weekend is defined as any time during Friday,
Saturday, or Sunday. Alternative definitions show minimal change. * p < 0.1; ** p <
0.05; *** p < 0.01

92

Table 9: Poisson Regression of the Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region on
Program Intensity
Rides Given

(1)
-0.00375
(3.94)***

School in Session

(2)
-0.00179
(1.38)
0.23457
(2.73)***

Daily Precipitation (cm)
Daily Snowfall (cm)
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)
Daily Minimum Temperature
(Co)
Constant

0.08904
(1.29)
7,598
Yes

-0.33866
(2.70)***
7,598
Yes
Yes

(3)
-0.00171
(1.32)
0.22194
(2.58)***
-0.01921
(0.69)
-0.30602
(3.49)***
0.00423
(0.13)

(4)
-0.00484
(4.81)***
0.22519
(2.71)***
-0.01245
(0.42)
-0.31332
(3.53)***
0.01205
(0.36)

0.00648

0.00384

(1.34)
-0.24794
(1.82)*
7,598
Yes
Yes

(0.83)

N
7,598
Clustering by Hour of Week
Yes
Month Controls
Yes
Hour of Week Fixed Effects
Yes
(168)
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option
200 times to avoid overdispersion. The sample was restricted to contain only the hours in
which the program was open. Alternative definitions show minimal change. * p < 0.1; **
p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 10: Poisson Regression of the Two Types of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride
Region on Program Intensity

Rides Given
School in Session
Daily Precipitation (cm)
Daily Snowfall (cm)
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)
Daily Minimum Temperature (Co)

Social and Property
Crimes
-0.00401
(3.29)***
0.00254
(0.08)
-0.29023
(2.76)***
0.02503
(0.75)
0.00355
(0.69)
0.21977
(2.25)**

Social and Property Crimes
-0.00688
(3.76)***
-0.05397
(1.01)
-0.37316
(1.94)*
-0.02397
(0.40)
0.00472
(0.62)
0.23922
(1.57)

Constant
N
7,598
7,598
Clustering by Hour of Week
Yes
Yes
Month Controls
Yes
Yes
Hour of Week Fixed Effects (168)
Yes
Yes
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option
200 times to avoid overdispersion. The sample was restricted to contain only the hours in
which the program was open. The weekend is defined as any time during Friday,
Saturday, or Sunday. Alternative definitions show minimal change. * p < 0.1; ** p <
0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 11: Poisson Regression of Crime Counts in the Safe Ride Region on Program
Intensity with a Weekend Interaction Term
Rides Given
Rides Given * Weekend

(1)
-0.00295
(3.00)***
-0.00185
(1.91)*

(2)
-0.00081
(0.62)
-0.00193
(2.00)**
0.22222
(2.53)**

0.07288
(1.05)
7598
Yes

-0.34875
(2.71)***
7598
Yes
Yes

School in Session
Daily Precipitation (cm)
Daily Snowfall (cm)
Daily Snow on Ground (cm)
Daily Minimum Temperature (Co)
Constant

(3)
-0.00078
(0.58)
-0.00187
(1.94)*
0.21065
(2.40)**
-0.02148
(0.76)
-0.30165
(3.38)***
0.00462
(0.14)
0.00590
(1.23)
-0.26222
(1.87)*
7598
Yes
Yes

(4)
-0.00306
(2.81)***
-0.00513
(3.36)***
0.22103
(2.65)***
-0.01318
(0.45)
-0.31940
(3.57)***
0.01195
(0.36)
0.00372
(0.80)

N
7598
Clustering by Hour of Week
Yes
Month Controls
Yes
Hour of Week Fixed Effects (168)
Yes
Note: T-statistics are in parentheses, and reflect bootstrapping with a clustering option
200 times to avoid overdispersion. The sample was restricted to contain only the hours in
which the program was open. The weekend is defined as any time during Friday,
Saturday, or Sunday. Alternative definitions show minimal change. * p < 0.1; ** p <
0.05; *** p < 0.01
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Table 12: Summary Statistics
Mean
Standard Deviation
Marquette Weekly Crime Count
45.59
18.75
MSOE Weekly Crime Count
23.65
11.27
Snow on Ground (mm)
24.45
57.72
Minimum Temperature (◦C)
5.24
109.99
Spring Semester
0.34
0.47
Fall Semester
0.28
0.45
Summer School
0.25
0.43
Safe Rides Delivered
4794.34
2797.38
Bus Rides Delivered
623.10
752.84
Total Rides Delivered
5417.44
3289.56
Notes: Bus rides delivered are averaged over the weeks of bus service
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Table 13: Evidence of Substitution between Transit Services
VARIABLES
Policy
Policy *Time Trend
Time Trend

(1)
-1736*
(899.1)
5.841
(5.412)
-0.666
(4.516)

4,798***
(433.1)

(2)
-1771***
(589.8)
7.901**
(3.478)
-2.751
(2.897)
4,174***
(365.6)
3,989***
(389.2)
66.75
(471.0)
5.466**
(2.201)
-1.538
(1.622)
2,257***
(401.6)

(3)
-1680***
(452.2)
7.693***
(2.654)
-2.666
(2.180)
4,847***
(1,178)
2,212***
(741.8)
-46.17
(910.1)
-4.107***
(1.391)
-9.204***
(2.091)
711.2***
(272.5)
YES

365
0.011

365
0.627

365
0.815

Spring Semester
Fall Semester
Summer Semester
Snow on Ground (mm)
Minimum Temperature (C)
Constant
Week of Year Dummies
Observations
R-squared

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Dependent variable is the number of rides delivered by the safe ride program.
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Table 14: Crime in the Marquette University Neighborhood vs Control
VARIABLES
Policy
Policy*MU Neighborhood
MU Neighborhood

(1)
-3.693***
(1.192)
-6.328***
(2.250)
29.65***
(1.760)

Snow on Ground (mm)
Minimum Temperature (C)

(2)
-3.934***
(1.174)
-6.783***
(2.137)
32.05***
(3.491)
-0.0176
(0.0109)
0.0360***
(0.00802)

(3)
-3.936***
(1.182)
-6.929***
(2.147)
37.17***
(4.369)
-0.00505
(0.0125)
0.0274*
(0.0151)

(4)
-1.198
(2.231)
-6.926***
(2.148)
37.10***
(4.388)
-0.00401
(0.0125)
0.0295*
(0.0152)
-0.0150
(0.0105)

YES

YES
YES
19.08***
(5.944)

YES
YES
20.64***
(6.007)

(5)
0.879
(2.350)
-11.08**
(4.378)
35.34***
(4.663)
-0.00405
(0.0125)
0.0295*
(0.0153)
-0.0263**
(0.0114)
0.0227
(0.0208)
YES
YES
21.39***
(6.010)

730
0.547

730
0.548

Time Trend
MU Neighborhood*Time Trend
School Calendar Interactions
Week of Year Dummies
Constant

Observations
R-squared

25.67***
(0.953)

22.63***
(1.631)

730
730
730
0.455
0.512
0.545
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 15: Decomposition of MU
MU vs MSOE
(Original
Estimate)
0.879
(2.350)
-11.08**
(4.378)

VARIABLES
Policy
Policy*MU Neighborhood
Policy*MU Bus Neighborhood

MU Bus vs
MSOE
0.890
(2.306)

-7.235**
(3.361)

Policy*MU Safe Ride Neighborhood

-4.912
(3.216)

MU Neighborhood

35.34***
(4.663)

MU Bus Neighborhood

6.256
(3.802)

MU Safe Ride Neighborhood
Snow on Ground (mm)

-0.00405
(0.0125)
0.0295*
(0.0153)
-0.0263**
(0.0114)
0.0227
(0.0208)

Minimum Temperature (C)
Time Trend
MU Neighborhood*Time Trend
MU Bus Neighborhood*Time Trend

0.00140
(0.0101)
0.0176
(0.0122)
-0.0268**
(0.0112)

4.338
(3.373)
-0.0149
(0.0105)
0.00639
(0.0117)
-0.0255**
(0.0109)

0.0346**
(0.0164)

MU Safe Ride Neighborhood*Time Trend

0.0162
(0.0151)

School Calendar Interactions
Week of Year Dummies
Constant

Observations
R-squared

MU Safe
Rides vs
MSOE
0.655
(2.273)

YES
YES
21.39***
(6.010)

730
0.548
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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YES
YES
24.89***
(5.533)

YES
YES
19.14***
(3.763)

730
0.191

730
0.186

Table 16: MU Safe Ride vs MU Bus Areas
VARIABLES
Policy

(1)
-4.479***
(1.292)
-1.064
(1.719)
-5.236***
(1.313)

Policy*MU Safe Ride Neighborhood
MU Safe Ride Neighborhood
Snow on Ground (mm)
Minimum Temperature (C)

(2)
-4.821***
(1.248)
-1.054
(1.659)
-3.840
(2.583)
0.00444
(0.0108)
0.0334***
(0.0126)

Time Trend
MU Safe Ride Neighborhood*Time Trend
School Calendar Interactions
Week of Year Dummies
Constant

Observations
R-squared

30.28***
(0.999)

YES
YES
35.14***
(5.420)

730
730
0.101
0.229
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(3)
-5.889**
(2.429)
2.239
(3.282)
-2.285
(2.793)
0.00467
(0.0107)
0.0338***
(0.0126)
0.00589
(0.0120)
-0.0181
(0.0156)
YES
YES
34.68***
(5.292)
730
0.231

Table 17: Initial Robustness Checks
Regions Included in Regression

Original
Estimates

University vs Control

Bus Area vs Control

Safe Ride Only Area vs Control

False
Treatment
(One Yr.
After)
3.660
(4.278)

Two
Leads
(6 month)

Alternative
Control
(Bay View)

-11.08**
(4.378)

False
Treatment
(One Yr.
Prior)
-0.991
(3.882)

-10.82**
(5.271)

-14.98**
(6.398)

-7.235**
(3.361)

-2.292
(3.067)

0.0733
(3.226)

-8.438**
(4.085)

-11.95**
(5.813)

-4.912
(3.216)

-4.511
(2.821)

4.517
(3.160)

-8.474**
(3.973)

-9.734*
(5.744)

Bus Area vs Safe Ride Only

2.239
-2.250
4.332
-0.324
2.239
(3.282)
(3.012)
(3.163)
(4.023)
(3.282)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Each entry is from a different regression. The leads are the two six month periods
prior to the bus service and these are also interacted with the treatment areas. The
alternative control is a comparable neighborhood in the same city. The comparison
between the bus area and safe ride only area is independent of the choice of control.
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Table 18: Additional Robustness Checks
Regions Included in Regression

Original
Estimates

Dropping
Irrelevant
Offenses

Including
Expansion

University vs MSOE

-11.08**
(4.38)

-10.97**
(4.332)

-13.54***
(4.450)

MU Interior
(Including Bus
Line Interior as
Treated)
-11.08**
(4.38)

Bus Area vs MSOE

-7.235**
(3.361)

-7.006**
(3.326)

-7.235**
(3.361)

-9.238**
(3.742)

-4.912
(3.216)

-4.838
(3.188)

-6.027*
(3.147)

-3.590
(2.953)

Safe Ride Only Area vs MSOE

Bus Area vs Safe Ride Only

2.239
2.091
0.0622
-4.311
(3.282)
(3.249)
(3.432)
(3.412)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Each entry is from a different regression. MU interior (including bus line interior
as treated), line 1 is the same as original estimates by necessity, nothing changes in either
of the comparison groups.
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Table 19: Bus Program Is More Effective On Weekends
VARIABLES
University vs MSOE

Full Sample
-11.08**
(4.378)

Weekends Only
-8.371***
(2.983)

Weekdays Only
-2.707
(2.635)

Bus Area vs MSOE

-7.235**
(3.361)

-5.301**
(2.409)

-1.934
(2.021)

-4.912
(3.216)

-4.455*
(2.360)

-0.459
(1.892)

Safe Ride Only Area vs MSOE

Bus Area vs Safe Ride Only

2.239
0.910
(3.282)
(2.357)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Each entry is from a different regression
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1.329
(2.056)

Table 20: Summary Statistics of Terrorism Data
VARIABLES
Mean Casualties
Median Casualties
0 $1
$ > 07
0 $1
$ > 57
0 $1
$ > 107
0 $1
$ > 257
0 $1
$ > 507
0 $1
$ > 1007
N
Types of Attacks Included

Conventional
CBRN
6.1
14.7
1
0
0.65
0.441
0.216
0.188
0.124
0.167
0.047
0.097
0.018
0.043
0.006
0.032
47476
186
Chemical Biological
Firearms
Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite
Radiological
Fake Weapons
Nuclear
Incendiary
Melee
Vehicle
Sabotage Equipment
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Table 21: Comparison of Means
VARIABLES
Historical Mean Casualties of All Attacks
Estimated Mean Casualties of Substantial Attacks
(Generalized Pareto)
Standard Deviation
Xi (Shape)

Conventional
6.1
66.7

CBRN
14.7
168.5

105
Infinite
0.4213
0.7610
(0.0293)***
(0.3767)**
Sigma (Skew)
24.1192
34.288
(0.8399)***
(15.4721)**
Threshold (Chosen Parametrically)
25
25
Note: The standard errors for the estimated parameters are listed in parentheses below the
estimate. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
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P

I

f&'()

f+,-.

1
1
1
1

1
10
20
30

4
2
2
2

2
1
1
1

Table 22: Results of Calibration Process
Sum of
Squared
Errors
0.0027
0.0114
0.0115
0.0115

z&'()

z+,-.

z&'()

z+,-.

ƒ&'()

ƒ+,-.

0.1016
2.9341
6.2674
9.6007

0.8984
7.0659
13.733
20.399

0.3602
0.3851
0.3851
0.3851

0.6398
0.6149
0.6149
0.6149

0.0574
4.9534e-4
6.3043e-07
8.0236e-10

0.0454
3.9211e-4
4.9879e-07
6.352e-10
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Tables, Appendix A: Can Safe Rides Reduce Urban Crime?
Table 23, Appendix A: Summary of Crime Count Data
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Offense Type
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT†‡
ALL OTHER LARCENY‡
ALL OTHER OFFENSES
ARSON‡
BURGLARY‡
COUNTERFEITING/FORGERY
CREDIT CARD/ATM FRAUD
DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY
DISORDERLY CONDUCT
EXTORTION/BLACKMAIL
FALSE PRETENSES/SWINDLE/CONFIDENCE GAME
FORCIBLE FONDLING†‡
FORCIBLE RAPE†‡
FORCIBLE SODOMY†‡
HOMICIDE†‡
IMPERSONATION
INCEST†
INTIMIDATION†
KIDNAPPING†
LIQUOR LAW VIOLATIONS
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT‡
POCKET PICKING
PURSE SNATCHING
ROBBERY†‡∗
SEXUAL ASSAULT WITH AN OBJECT†‡
SHOPLIFTING‡
SIMPLE ASSAULT†
STATUTORY RAPE†
STOLEN PROPERTY OFFENSES
THEFT FROM BUILDING‡
THEFT FROM COIN-OPERATED MACHINES‡
THEFT FROM MOTOR VEHICLE‡
THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLE PARTS‡
TRESPASSING
WEAPON LAW VIOLATIONS

Count of Offenses
1488
3815
97
82
2730
4
9
5081
262
0
1
97
75
53
28
4
1
29
100
20
2493
51
110
1788
15
333
1912
45
8
198
33
5655
1951
66
0

Note: Crimes were categorized as a crime against persons (†) or otherwise according to
the Uniform Crime Reporting classification system. ∗ = This crime always is
accompanied by an assault, so it has an element of crimes against persons which is not
recorded separately. Crimes reported to the UCR are marked with a ‡.
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Tables, Appendix B: University Provided Transit and Urban Crime
Table 24, Appendix B: Crime in the Marquette University Neighborhood vs Control:
Alternative Specifications
(1)
Linear
Model

VARIABLES

Policy
Policy*MU Neighborhood
MU Neighborhood
Snow on Ground (mm)
Minimum Temperature (C)
Time Trend
MU Neighborhood*Time Trend
Constant

0.879
(2.350)
-11.08**
(4.378)
35.34***
(4.663)
-0.00405
(0.0125)
0.0295*
(0.0153)
-0.0263**
(0.0114)
0.0227
(0.0208)
21.39***
(6.010)

(2)
Log Crime
Model

(3)
Poisson
Model

0.0777
0.0475
(0.110)
(0.0953)
-0.311**
-0.251**
(0.137)
(0.119)
0.996***
0.921***
(0.150)
(0.127)
-0.000521
-0.000201
(0.000484) (0.000402)
0.000471 0.000833**
(0.000491) (0.000420)
-0.00115** -0.00117**
(0.000537) (0.000466)
0.00120*
0.00111*
(0.000667) (0.000576)
2.894***
3.167***
(0.194)
(0.169)

School Calendar Interactions
Week of Year Dummies
Alpha (Dispersion Parameter)

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

Observations
R-squared
Pseudo-R-Squared
Log Pseudolikelihood

730
0.548

728
0.511

730

0.3725
-3729.86
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

108

(4)
Negative
Binomial
Model
0.0468
(0.0916)
-0.241**
(0.116)
0.959***
(0.134)
-0.000306
(0.000391)
0.000520
(0.000417)
-0.00115**
(0.000458)
0.00104*
(0.000574)
3.078***
(0.174)
YES
YES
-2.111***
(0.0815)
730

-2901.37

Tables, Appendix C: Modeling Adversary Preference and Strategic
Response
Table 25, Appendix C: Derivative of Model at Estimated Nash Values
P

I

1
1
1
1

1
10
20
30

f&'() f+,-.
4
2
2
2

2
1
1
1

z&'()

0.1016
2.9341
6.2674
9.6007

z+,-.

0.8984
7.0659
13.733
20.399

z &'()

0.3602
0.3851
0.3851
0.3851
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z+,-. %&'() %+,-.

0.6398
0.6149
0.6149
0.6149

66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7

168.5
168.5
168.5
168.5

&'()

&'()

-0.4388
-2.2252
-4.4473
-6.6696

&'()

+,-.

1.6514
4.9674
9.4124
13.8561

Table 26, Appendix C: Government Second Order Conditions for Conventional δ
P

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

I

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

f&'()
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

f+,-.
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

%&'()
66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7

%+,-.
168.5
168.5
168.5
168.5
168.5
168.5
168.5
168.5

z&'()
0.4480
0.2683
0.1637
0.1017
0.0623
0.0359
0.0175
0.0043
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z+,-.
0.5520
0.7317
0.8363
0.8983
0.9377
0.9641
0.9825
0.9957

z&'()
0.6149
0.5000
0.4189
0.3602
0.3160
0.2815
0.2538
0.2311

z+,-.
0.3851
0.5000
0.5811
0.6398
0.684
0.7185
0.7462
0.7689

SOC (C21)
-149.6119
-312.0027
-279.3436
-224.4579
-212.1286
-224.5097
-241.5723
-255.4606

Table 27, Appendix C: Government Second Order Conditions for CBRN δ
P

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

I

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

f&'()
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

f+,-.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

%&'()
66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7
66.7

%+,-.
168.5
168.5
168.5
168.5
168.5
168.5
168.5
168.5
168.5

z&'()
0.2683
0.4656
0.5894
0.6730
0.7324
0.7766
0.8104
0.8370
0.8584
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z+,-.
0.7317
0.5344
0.4106
0.3270
0.2676
0.2234
0.1896
0.1630
0.1416

z&'()
0.5000
0.5811
0.6398
0.6840
0.7185
0.7462
0.7689
0.7879
0.8040

z+,-.
0.5000
0.4189
0.3602
0.3160
0.2815
0.2538
0.2311
0.2121
0.1960

SOC (C21)
-312.0027
-361.1654
-425.0426
-502.0573
-591.0325
-691.3171
-802.5532
-924.5398
-1.0572e03

Appendix C: Modeling Adversary Preference and Strategic
Response
Model Solutions
Adversary:
We begin by maximizing the adversary utility function, who is the second mover, subject
to its resource constraint:
VP = %&'() >1 −

ABYZC[
DYZC[

EF

GHYZC[ IYZC[

$ .

=

P

J + %+,-. >1 −

&'()

+

AB\]^_
D\]^_

EF

GH\]^_ I\]^_

J (C1)

+,-.

(C2)

This leads us to:
„P = %&'() >1 −

ABYZC[
DYZC[

EF

…P 0

P

GHYZC[ IYZC[

−

&'()

−

J + %+,-. >1 −
+,-. 7

AB\]^_
D\]^_

EF

GH\]^_ I\]^_

J+

(C3)

The first order condition for this problem is algebraically symmetric. Thus, for either
attack type, n ( = 1,2) the derivatives are:
†‡

†PC

†‡

†‰B

=

=

ABC

cC o DC o AˆC DC

P

−

HC

&'()

−

− …P = 0

(C4)

+,-.

(C5)

=0

It is clear from the above equations that only a constrained condition can hold (i.e.,

λa ≠ 0) , otherwise ∂L/ ∂an will be positive for all finite an values, only approaching 0 as
(

→ ∞. Thus, eliminating
ABYZC[

λa the FOC, implies ∂L / ∂aconv = ∂L / ∂aCBRN or,

cYZC[ o DYZC[ o AˆYZC[ DYZC[
HYZC[

−

BYZC[ AaB

c\]^_ o D\]^_ o Aˆ\]^_ D\]^_
H\]^_
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=0

(C6)

Substituting for

+,-.

=

P

−

&'()

, the best response function of the adversary, in the

case of conventional weapon’s strategy is:
∗
&'() 0 &'() ,

+,-. , &'() , +,-. , %&'() , %+,-. 7

=

X
‹AˆYZC[ DYZC[ D\]^_
a
W(Š YZC[
Œ`I\]^_ H\]^_ ` B
X\]^_ DYZC[
b
b
`
DYZC[ D\]^_

D\]^_

(C7)
The second order conditions is:
Gc\]^_ o

•
Aˆ\]^_ D\]^_ ABYZC[ ŽaB
D\]^_
H\]^_ •

−

cYZC[ o

•
AˆYZC[ DYZC[ ŽBYZC[
DYZC[
HYZC[ •

<0

(C8)

This is always negative under a simple expected condition. The adversary has positive
interest in destroying the area: %( > 0.
Comparative Statics
Since the remainder of the resources are fully spent, best response for CBRN strategy
become:

∗
+,-. 0 &'() ,

+,-. 7

=

P

−

∗
&'() 0 &'() ,

+,-. 7.

Thus all comparative statics

below hold with a reverse sign for the latter.
To examine the comparative statics, first we examine the effect of higher
government counterinsurgency effort. We find that,
NPYZC[

NIYZC[

= − H YZC[`H\]^_ < 0

NPYZC[

NI\]^_

H

YZC[

•

H

= H YZC[`H\]^_ > 0
H

YZC[

H

(C9)

\]^_
•

\]^_

(C10)

Notice the presence of a substitution in best response: A rise in government
counterinsurgency effort in CBRN category causes adversary to shift resources towards
great effort in the conventional category.
Next we examine the weight in the adversary utility function of each class of
attack and find the results as expected:
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NPYZC[

NcYZC[

NPYZC[

Nc\]^_

=

HYZC[ H\]^_

cYZC[ 0HYZC[ `H\]^_ 7

= −c

HYZC[ H\]^_

>0

\]^_ 0HYZC[ `H\]^_ 7

(C11)

<0

(C12)

Finally, we focus on the best response functions of the logistical complexity parameter,

δ :
NPYZC[
NHYZC[

=−

D
X
H\]^_ 0HYZC[ `H\]^_ GpB GH\]^_ •‘’0 \]^_ YZC[ 7`HYZC[ • IYZC[ GH\]^_ • I\]^_ ` HYZC[ H\]^_ IYZC[ 7
DYZC[ X\]^_

0HYZC[ `H\]^_ 7•

(C13)
NPYZC[
NH\]^_

=

D
X
HYZC[ 0HYZC[ `H\]^_ GpB `HYZC[ •‘’0 \]^_ YZC[ 7GHYZC[ • IYZC[ `H\]^_ • I\]^_ ` HYZC[ H\]^_ I\]^_ 7
DYZC[ X\]^_

0HYZC[ `H\]^_ 7•

(C14)
Here, we find the results to be ambiguous. One reason for this is the complex manner by
which this parameter enters in to the optimal decision. To see this examine, for example
equation C6). Here one can see that a rise delta has several conflicting effects. We have
numerically estimated these values at the Nash equilibrium in Table 25, Appendix C.
In this section, it has been shown that best response function for the adversary.
This best response function is indeed a maximum by the second order condition, equation
C8. Now the best response function is given to the first mover, the government.

Government:
The government, as a Stackelberg leader, maximizes the utility function:
/0VI 7 = %&'() Š1 − Š1 −

AB∗YZC[
DYZC[

Œ

GHYZC[ IYZC[

Œ + %+,-. Š1 − Š1 −
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AB∗\]^_
D\]^_

Œ

GH\]^_ I\]^_

Œ

(C15)

where

∗
&'() 0 &'() ,

(equation C7) and

+,-. , &'() , +,-. , %&'() , %+,-. 7is

∗
+,-. 0 &'() ,

from the adversaries best response

+,-. , &'() , +,-. , %&'() , %+,-. 7 is

from the counterpart

of that equation. It is subject to the resource constraint:
$ .

I

=

&'()

+

+,-.

(C16)

The Lagrangian for this problem is:
„I = %&'() Š1 − Š1 −
+…I F I −

&'()

∗
ABYZC[
DYZC[

−

Œ

+,-. J

GIYZC[ HYZC[

Œ + %+,-. Š1 − Š1 −

AB∗\]^_
D\]^_

Œ

GI\]^_ H\]^_

(C17)
Using similar reasoning as for the adversary, we note that the constraint must bind. For,
if it does not, there is a trivial solution as

(

→ ∞, and Ug takes its highest possible value

of wconv+wCBRN.
Substituting for the best response functions for
•
„I = %&'() ”
•
+%+,-. ”
”
”
“

“

GHYZC[ IYZC[

•
GH\]^_ I\]^_ ”
”
”
“

•
”
“

∗
&'() ,

∗
+,-. .

D
X
‹ADYZC[ ˆYZC[
aB
A–Zˆ— \]^_ YZC[
˜ŽD\]^_ ˆ\]^_ Ž
DYZC[ X\]^_
D\]^_
b
b
DYZC[ >
Ž
E
DYZC[ D\]^_

D
X
‹ADYZC[ ˆYZC[
aB
–Zˆ— \]^_ YZC[
˜ŽD\]^_ ˆ\]^_ Ž
DYZC[ X\]^_
D\]^_
AaB A
b
b
Ž
DYZC[ D\]^_
D\]^_

−…I F

&'()

+

+,-.

−

IJ

›
›
− 1š + 1š
™

™

™

™

›
›
š
− 1š
š + 1š
š
š

(C18)
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Œ

We note the constraint must bind, so after substituting in

I

−

+,-.

=

&'() ,

we can

solve this as a function of a single variable, gconv.
•
„I = %&'() ”
“

•
%+,-. ”
”
”

GHYZC[ IYZC[

•
”
“

•

GH\]^_ Fpˆ GIYZC[ J ”

”
”

“

D
XYZC[ ‹ADYZC[ ˆYZC[
aB
A–Zˆ— \]^_
˜ŽD\]^_ 0aˆ AˆYZC[ 7Ž
DYZC[ X\]^_
D\]^_
b
b
DYZC[ >
Ž
E
DYZC[ D\]^_

›
›
− 1š + 1š +

D
X
‹ADYZC[ ˆYZC[
aB
–Zˆ— \]^_ YZC[
˜ŽD\]^_ 0aˆ AˆYZC[ 7Ž
DYZC[ X\]^_
D\]^_
AaB A
b
b
Ž
DYZC[ D\]^_
D\]^_

“

™

™

›
›
š
− 1š + 1š
š
š
š
™

™

(C19)

Then taking derivatives with respect to
%&'() e

&'() ,

we get the FOC:

X
D
aB Ž•žŸ0 YZC[ \]^_ 7D\]^_ ŽDYZC[ • ˆYZC[ AD\]^_ • ˆYZC[ ŽD\]^_ • aˆ
X\]^_ DYZC[
DYZC[ ŽD\]^_

G

%&'() e

X
D
aB Ž•žŸ> YZC[ \]^_ ED\]^_ ŽDYZC[ • ˆYZC[ AD\]^_ • ˆYZC[ ŽD\]^_ • aˆ
X\]^_ DYZC[
G
DYZC[ ŽD\]^_

%+,-. e
%+,-. e

X
D
aB A•žŸ> YZC[ \]^_ EDYZC[ ŽDYZC[ • ˆYZC[ AD\]^_ • ˆYZC[ ŽD\]^_ • aˆ
X\]^_ DYZC[
G
DYZC[ŽD\]^_

G

X
D
aB A•žŸ> YZC[ \]^_ EDYZC[ ŽDYZC[ • ˆYZC[ AD\]^_ • ˆYZC[ ŽD\]^_ • aˆ
X\]^_ DYZC[
DYZC[ŽD\]^_

%&'() eGIYZC[HYZC[

&'()

− %+,-. eH\]^_ FIYZC[GpˆJ

+,-.

=0

+,-.

−

&'()

−

&'()

+

+,-.

+

(C20)

While the first order condition does not allow us to isolate for gconv*, we can solve for it
numerically, allowing us to solve the model.

Then taking derivatives with respect to

&'() ,

we get the SOC:
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A

cb

cYZC[

A

aB Ž•žŸ>

aB Ž•žŸ>

c\]^_

A

c\]^_

XYZC[ D\]^_
•
•
•
ED
ŽD
ˆ
AD
ˆ
ŽD
a
X\]^_ DYZC[ \]^_ YZC[ YZC[ \]^_ YZC[ \]^_ ˆ
DYZC[ ŽD\]^_
HYZC[ FHYZC[ • GH\]^_ • J
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HYZC[ `H\]^_

+

HYZC[ `H\]^_

−

XYZC[ D\]^_
•ˆ
•ˆ
•a
ED
ŽD
AD
ŽD
X\]^_ DYZC[ YZC[ YZC[ YZC[ \]^_ YZC[ \]^_ ˆ
DYZC[ ŽD\]^_
HYZC[ FHYZC[ • GH\]^_ • J

aB A•žŸ>

−

%&'() eGIYZC[HYZC[ −

XYZC[ D\]^_
•
•
•
ED
ŽD
ˆ
AD
ˆ
ŽD
a
X\]^_ DYZC[ \]^_ YZC[ YZC[ \]^_ YZC[ \]^_ ˆ
DYZC[ ŽD\]^_
H\]^_ FHYZC[ • GH\]^_ • J

aB A•žŸ>

A

HYZC[ `H\]^_

XYZC[ D\]^_
•ˆ
•ˆ
•a
ED
ŽD
AD
ŽD
X\]^_ DYZC[ YZC[ YZC[ YZC[ \]^_ YZC[ \]^_ ˆ
DYZC[ ŽD\]^_
H\]^_ FHYZC[ • GH\]^_ • J

HYZC[ `H\]^_

(C21)
We evaluate this numerically in Appendix C, Table 26 and Table 27 to determine if it is
less than zero in each circumstance, testing if gconv* is indeed a maximum for the
government.
The value of λg is found by looking at the derivative of the Lagrangian with
respect to gconv without substitution, and inserting the appropriate values.
% •eGIYZC[ HYZC[
“

&'()

−e

G

aB Ž•žŸ>

XYZC[ D\]^_
•ˆ
•ˆ
ED
ŽD
ŽD
X\]^_ DYZC[ \]^_ YZC[ YZC[ \]^_ \]^_
DYZC[ ŽD\]^_

X
D
aB Ž•žŸ> YZC[ \]^_ ED\]^_ ŽDYZC[ • ˆYZC[ ŽD\]^_ • ˆ\]^_
X\]^_ DYZC[
A
DYZC[ ŽD\]^_
HYZC[ H\]^_

HYZC[ `H\]^_

›−
™

X
D
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A
DYZC[ ŽD\]^_
HYZC[ • c\]^_

HYZC[ `H\]^_
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&'()

= …I

(C22)

+

Appendix D: Search for Best Threshold Value
In the QQ plots Figure 12 and Figure 13, the threshold of 10 casualties, shown in
the first rows, does not produce a good fit. As can been seen from the two rows, the
General Pareto model with a threshold of 10 casualties overestimates the bulk of
conventional casualties while fitting that same model to the CBRN attacks underestimate
the bulk of CBRN casualties. This threshold choice, therefore does not fit either data set
particularly well.
The next natural threshold choice, 25 casualties, shown in the second rows,
matches the QQ plot well for both conventional and CBRN attacks, and is able to capture
a small number of large casualty events that are relevant in light of its highly right
skewed shape. The fact that a threshold of 25 casualties seems to fit both conventional
and CBRN attacks makes it a particularly appealing choice as our threshold for both,
reducing empirical differences between each half of the model, and giving an equivalent
definition of “substantial” to both types of attack.
We also tried a threshold level of 50 casualties, shown in the last row of Figures
12 and 13. This seems to be a poor threshold choice because it leaves very few (only
eight) CBRN data points for use. For this reason, we reject 50 casualties as an appropriate
choice, and use 25 casualties. This leaves us with approximately the upper 10% of our
out-the-door CBRN attacks, and the upper 5% of our out-the-door conventional attack
data.
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Endnotes
In addition to student safety, 26% of safe ride programs list good publicity as a reason
for the creation of the program (Harding et al., 1988).
2
Lacey, et al. (October 2000) study the influence of safe rides on drunk driving, but do
not examine other types of crime.
3
The yearly cost of BOSS averaged over the period of the study is $425,000.60, which
was then divided by the number of yearly rides to get the cost per ride (University of
Wisconsin Accounting Services, 2013).
4
Due to the ending date, some only extend to 181 days, so there are only 180 observable
changes. Thus, there are 30,684 (≈168x182) entries for each combination of date and
hour of the week.
5
The COMPASS system does not have any information about the victim or suspected
perpetrator.
6
Note that the service region includes a small neighboring suburb, and data is not
available for that suburb. A few crime entries have insufficient geographic detail to
identify the location, and are excluded. Finally, prior to the COMPASS data in 2005,
there is no way to match crime to the service region of the safe ride program.
7
Simple regressions of crime counts on trend return a significant positive coefficient
while regressions of open hours on trend returns a near zero and insignificant coefficient.
8
Maximum temperature was also collected, and used, but did not impact results
significantly and so it was subsequently removed for brevity.
9
The percentage change in crime from an increase in z is ¢∆¤ − 1, which is
approximately ¥ for small ¥.
10
After testing if measures for overdispersion are needed, a simple comparison shows
that the variance of crime is about three times larger the mean, which suggests
overdispersion (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). Another test of overdispersion indicates
that it is not important, with residual deviance (51876) being less than twice that of the
degrees of freedom (30463) (Palmer et al., 2007; Lindsey, 1999). Erring on the side of
caution, bootstrapping is used.
11
The other regressions in the paper have been examined with OLS and the results have
been found to be very similar.
12
A final threat to identification would be the creation of other campus crime programs.
In January 2008, a small safe walk escort program began in the two blocks immediately
around campus. Yet, removing all of the observations after its establishment does not
diminish the coefficient of the safe ride program or its significance.
13
In fact, in the typically open sample a zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP) model is shown to be
preferred to the Poisson by a Vuong Test (Vuong, 1989), with a test statistic from the
normal distribution of 14.63, and a p-value indistinguishable from 0.
14
It may be worth noting that while STATA discards estimations in an APE that do not
converge, instead this algorithm repeated the estimation process until 200 successful
convergences occurred.
15
Uniquely, this bias may be minimized in this data set because the number of fixed
effects that must be calculated was limited. Instead of having many different individuals,
1
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this data set has a substantial number of time periods (182) per fixed effect, which may
greatly mitigate the bias of incidental parameters, it is expected to be on the order of
1/182 (Greene, 2002)
16
A breakdown of the crime categories, and the frequency in which they occur, is in
Table 12, placed in the Appendix.
17
A number of other definitions of weekend were examined, and no meaningful variation
occurred.
18
The program is committed to sending a van to all who ask for a ride during the hours of
operation.
19
This estimation was repeated in the Bay View data set yielding a coefficient of 0.0001,
with a standard error of 0.0016, again suggesting that the significance of the estimates are
not an accident.
20
Over the hours the program is open, 1,352 crimes of the type reported to the UCR a
year were reported to local police. These types of crimes are labeled, along with their
frequency in the data set, in Table 12, found in the Appendix. If the program causes a
14% reduction in crime while operating, in accordance with the Poisson estimates, the
actual crime count would have been 1,572 without the program. This is a reduction of
220 crimes associated with the program.
21
The estimates of elasticity of police per capita to nonviolent crime per capita was used,
-0.501, the larger of the two broad crime categories, and a constant population was
assumed for the sake of simplicity.
22
There are currently 2,586 officers, and a new officer is salaried at $42,563 (City of
Milwaukee , 2013), A quick calculation shows 2,586*1.2%*$42,563 = $1,318,179.
23
As with the falsification test, the coefficient of -0.152 for the treated neighborhood is
more than two standard deviations greater than this estimate.
24
UWM maintains its own set of sworn officers.
25
While data on the mix of transport programs across universities is not regularly
collected, as early as the 1990s 34% of public four-year universities and 24% of private
four-year universities reported operating a student transport program (Lewis et al., 1997).
26
There is a related suggestion that interstate highways through rural areas increase crime
by bringing criminals and potential victims more easily together (Marton 2013).
27
The campus consolidation and expansion in student housing predate the time window
we use to examine the advent of campus bus service.
28
COMPASS is the Community Mapping, Planning and Analysis for Safety Strategies
and it can be accessed at http://www.city.milwaukee.gov/compass.
29
Indeed, as a privacy restriction, the police withhold addresses for sexual assaults and so
these crimes are dropped from the sample.
30
The terms differ slightly between universities and the three dummies for the relevant
weeks of each university's term are entered as a determinants of crime only for the
respective university neighborhood.
31
The weeks in which class is not in session receive a zero for all three dummies.
32
We even experimented with allowing for four time trends, control and university
neighborhood both before and after the bus service. Including these simply do not reduce
the magnitude of the coefficient or its significance, maintaining the suggestion of a large
reduction in crime associated with the advent of the bus service.
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The addition of two or four time trends leaves the coefficient of interest essentially
unchanged.
34
It is worth noting that if the policy date is used in a placebo treatment of the MSOE vs.
the Bay View neighborhoods, it emerges as insignificant.
35
The dropped crimes are arson, bribery, burglary/breaking and entering,
counterfeiting/forgery, credit card/ATM fraud, false pretenses/swindle/confidence game,
impersonation, incest, weapon law violations, wire fraud and not classified.
36
These additional specifications are available upon request.
37
The phrasing of “successful” is in keeping with existing crime literature. In our case,
we call an attack “successful” if it has incurred casualties.
38
Later we will account for information asymmetries.
39
If one believes that the behavior of government and adversary should entail risk-averse
or precautionary behavior, can be defined to incorporate such parameters. If one
believes the true parameter is, say, ¦ but ¦ is subject to a shock §~ 00, © 7, then define
such that = ª0 ′, © 7. Note that it must be the case that /0 ¦ + 7 ≠ due to its
position in the exponent.
40
While we have assumed a linear utility, there remains only one unique solution to the
game. We note that, the utility is strictly concave in effort level, and the sites are
heterogeneous. Thus the solution remains unique, despite the linearity of utility in
expected damage (Zhuang and Bier, 2007).
41
Zhuang and Bier (2007) have described some single-target circumstances where
adversaries respond to an increase in government expenditures by increasing their own
effort, as strategic complements. They find that a particular family of multiple-target
games decompose into single-target games. They note such a breakdown will not, and
should not, occur in model like ours because both parties are strictly bound by their
budget constraints. In short, we assume there are not enough resources to treat each
attack as completely independent, and participants cannot expand their budget as a
response to changes.
42
See endnote 3, where the government is not risk neutral to shocks in ′ by construction.
43
We have explored a variety of levels for I = {1,10,20,30}, in order to consider the
fact that government expenditures are substantially larger than those of the terrorists. We
have found that the model fit is dramatically better, by a factor of 5, when they are both
normalized to 1. These results are shown in Table 3.
44
This can be established by evaluating GHI , from equation 3, at G .
45
For example, GTD also includes some CBRN data including those originally complied
by Mohtadi and Murshid (2006). We remove these and other CBRN data to avoid double
counting.
46
See also Mohtadi and Ruediger (2011) for a survey for extreme value literature as
applied to finance.
47
Note that µ and σ are related to, but not identical to the mean or standard deviation of
this distribution. It is possible to have well defined values of µ and σ, but have no finite
mean or standard deviation for a Pareto distribution as the asymptotic decay of the
distribution may be too slow for defined mean or variance. Such a case has occurred in
our estimations, as shown in Table 5.
48
We remind that we have already dropped attacks of the type that are deliberately lowcasualty: kidnappings, assassinations, and hostage-taking, and hope to mitigate this
33
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problem by doing so. We admit the importance of such impacts, but note that it is
impossible to quantify each of them. Without being able to explore such details, we rely
on the thought that adversaries prefer attacks with over 25 casualties rather than less.
49
We note that once an attack has made it out the door, the probability of successful
substantial attacks, P(Casualties>25) , is 0.047 for conventional attacks and 0.097 for
CBRN attacks.
50
For example, using least absolute deviation instead, would have led to a fit in only one
dimension.
51
The square root of 0.0007/2 is 1.8%
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